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ABSTRACT 
Author: Norman Mark St. Laurent 
Title: Airport Security Checkpoint Screeners: 
An Analytical Study of Job Retention and Attrition Factors 
Institution: Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University 
Degree: Master of Aeronautical Science 
Year: 1994 
The proposed research seeks to identify the factors contributing to job retention 
and job attrition in terms of why an airport security checkpoint screener would try or 
want to stay on the job or leave the job. By identifying the causes of employee 
satisfaction and dissatisfaction, and by understanding the integral components of 
employee turnover can develop appropriate interventions that curb existing retention 
problems (exceeding 70% annually in most facilities). Aside from the obvious costs 
affiliated with recruiting, selecting, and training replacement employees, there is likely 
to be a detrimental impact on the effectiveness of airline passenger screening when a 
substantial percentage of the workforce are novice workers. The success and deterrent 
potential of an airport security checkpoint is primarily dependent on the personnel who 
operate it. As with most safety-critical systems, there is no room for system-induced 
or operator-induced errors. 
To date there has been little emphasis placed on the selection of airport security 
checkpoint sreeners. In a report by the 1989 Presidents Commission on Aviation 
v 
Security and Terrorism (Presidents Commission, 1990), the commission was critical 
toward the Federal Aviation Administration with regard to how little attention was paid 
on recruiting and motivating security personnel. The significance of the work has 
many dementions to it. Ideas and conclusions formulated from these concerns and 
issues are essential in addressing the empirical attention needed in this area. They also 
carry strong implications toward the standardization of screening and hiring of airport 
security checkpoint screeners and towards the development of a standardized protocol 
that can be applied industry-wide. 
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Airport Security Checkpoint Screener: 
An Analytical Study of Job Retention and Attrition Factors 
Introduction 
Air travel is by far the safest method of transportation. It is important, 
however, to place the increasing problem of aviation terrorism and sabotage into proper 
* 
perspective. This is especially meaningful as it relates to the significance of the role 
each individual airport security checkpoint screener has in controlling this increasing 
problem. The goal of this thesis is to focus on the human factors issues of job retention 
and attrition within airport security companies who are contracted by the airlines. "The 
success and continuity of any organization...is ultimately determined by the 
productivity of its employees as well as the satisfaction that they derive from their jobs, 
fellow workers, management, and the rewards system of the organization" (Dunn and 
Stephens, 1972, p. 2). Given the negative effects of unwanted employee turnover on 
airport security checkpoint operations, organizational sensitivity to the antecedents of 
employee satisfaction and intentions to leave is consequential and warrants empirical 
attention. 
By the year 2000, airlines around the world will transport nearly two billion 
passengers a year. Even if the accident rate equals that of the lowest year in aviation 
history, a thousand passengers will lose their lives each year. The factors that 
1 
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contribute to the dangers of air travel can range anywhere from human factor mistakes, 
aging aircraft, crowded skies, over-burdened air traffic control systems, to abrupt 
weather. Intricating these aviation and airport problems is the ever present distressing 
and sophisticated threat of terrorism and sabotage. Unfortunately, history has shown 
that motivation to achieve competent security frequently comes in the wake of tragic 
incidents. 
Impact and Bflferrivftngss 
The safeguarding of civil aviation against acts of unlawful interference has been 
a matter of critical concern to Governments of the world. The civil aviation program 
has no option but to take the problem seriously. The risk of a terrorist incident or 
sabotage act is always present and "...is not confined to the Middle East and other 
trouble spots in the world" (Oster, Strong, and Zorn, 1992, pg. 143) (see Figure 1). 
Such unjust acts have had a profound world-wide detrimental effect on civil aviation 
operations. For example, the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, 
on December 21, 1988, reminds travelers that the reality of the risk is real and can take 
place anywhere. 
Security factors that contributed directly to the destruction of Flight 103 
involved a combination of errors on the part of the air carrier and its security 
contractor. "These factors were passenger screening; baggage handling, especially 
matching passengers and their bags; almost complete reliance on X-ray equipment to 
find explosive devices; and the lack of an integrated information system to track 
passengers and their baggage on specific flights" (Vosburgh, 1993, p. 5). The cost of 
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Explosions Aboard Aircraft by Region 
1950-1989 
S. America 5 
^ ^ ^ N. America 18 
W. Europe 15 
E. Europe 1 
Middle East 9 
Asia 20 
Africa 4 
Explosions - Region (Total 72) 
Figure 1. Explosions Aboard Aircraft by Region 
these unlawful acts in terms of to the loss of human lives, disruption to air operations, 
and negative economic impacts is unfathomable. Terrorism against civil aviation will 
always be a threat. There are no set rules due to the fact that the elements involved 
will vary with the environment and location. The emotional attractiveness of such a 
malleable, newsworthy target allures those who commit acts of unlawful interference. 
As these acts interfere with the civil aviation system, a demand for continued 
resistance is required. There must be more " . . . world wide vigilance and the 
enhancement of security measures" (Sutherland, 1992, p. 6). 
The late 1960's and early 1970fs had a sudden and unexpected increase in 
aircraft hijackings. The response was a coordinated and extensive civil aviation 
security system instituted by the United States Government and the International Civil 
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Aviation Organization (ICAO). A significant part of that system is aircraft passenger 
security checkpoint screening using metal detectors and X-ray machines. "Since the 
initiation of mandatory security screening procedures in 1973, over 11 billion persons 
and their carry-on items have been screened. This has resulted in the detection of over 
45,600 firearms and more than 20,150 arrests" (Federal Aviation Administration, 1991 
p. 11). The effectiveness of the security procedures can be portrayed by comparing the 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) hijacking statistics for domestic air carrier • 
operations before and after the onset of the passenger security screener process (see 
Figure 2). 
"During the July 1, 1989, through December 31, 1989 reporting period, over 
535 million persons were processed through screening checkpoints at U.S. airports 
resulting in the detection of 1,464 firearms" (Federal Aviation Administration, 1991, 
Feb.). Of these 1,406 (96%) were detected by x-ray inspection, 30 (2%) by physical 
search, and 28 (2%) by use of metal detectors. In addition, ten explosive/incendiary 
devices were discovered during this period including five grenades, three fireworks, 
one flare gun, and one tear gas device. During this six month period, 764 persons 
were arrested at airport security screening checkpoints for unauthorized carriage of 
firearms or explosive/incendiary devices. "Study Tallies" (1991) analyzed hostile acts 
against civil aviation between January 1980 and December 1990. During that 11-year 
period, the investigators uncovered 304 hijacking incidents accounting to one every 13 
days. Foreign air carriers however encountered the majority of these hijackings. 
Aeroflot had the highest with 24, followed by LOT Airlines with 16, and Iran Air 
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Figure 2: The Effectiveness of Passenger Screening 
with 15. Although hijacking incidents do not materialize an immediate threat for U.S. 
operators, St. John (1991) stated, "As international security tightens, the United States, 
with its lack of safegards at airports, becomes more inviting to terrorists" (p.85). 
Oster, Strong, & Zorn (1992) concluded that the overall volume of terrorist activity has 
grown at an annual rate of about 12 to 15 percent during the 1980's. If that rate of 
increase continues, there could be a doubling of terrorist activity by the end of the 
decade. 
Routine inspections evaluating the effectiveness of airport security checkpoints 
report an average success rate of 90% in detecting test weapons that are designed to 
imitate explosives, incendiary, and deadly or dangerous weapons. Contrary to the 
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FAA 1991 report, the US General Accounting Office (GAO) Report (1987, April) 
reported that the nationwide success rate in the detection of test weapons was only 
80%. Additionally, the GAO report found immense variability with the success rate 
among airport security checkpoints in detecting test weapons. The report illustrates the 
lack of effectiveness and clearly demonstrates a need to focus on and accentuate 
productivity for airport security checkpoint personnel through job satisfaction and 
motivation. 
Job satisfaction is believed to have a direct bearing on motivation and job 
productivity. Job satisfaction is also believed to be reflected in both voluntary and 
involuntary turnover. Studies have shown a link between the employee's job 
satisfaction and the employee's speed and ability in acquiring skills on the job. Both 
intrinsic and extrinsic motivational factors should be reviewed to invigorate 
effectiveness. The Conference Board Inc. (1971) reported that motivation and 
productivity are inextricably linked. "Job design that takes into consideration human 
needs and motivations can provide the needed impetus for increased productivity. This 
is true despite automation, improved engineering, and other technological advances. 
Without worker motivation a large segment for the sought-for productivity standard is 
missing" (The Conference Board, Inc., 1971, p. 10). 
Emphasis on hiring practices to find qualified personnel with the proper 
motivation will result in a more suitable work force while reducing attrition for those 
not proficient or properly motivated in their profession. More importantly, developing 
a screening program that identifies and staffs the nation's airport security system with 
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the most capable, motivated, and qualified individuals will enhance the overall success 
and deterrent potential of the security system. 
As previously stated, the job of a security checkpoint screener is an extremely 
important one. Their efforts are responsible for the protection of the lives and safety of 
millions of travelers each year. How well each screener performs his/her job makes 
this protection possible. The task of the security checkpoint screener is so important to 
the overall security system that it is necessary to hire those who are best able to do the 
job, and who are willing to do the job for a long period of time. The use of 
psychological principals in the job environment have resulted in practical goals to 
reduce employee turnover, absenteeism, and low productivity. Additionally, they have 
improved the design of a working environment, designed human-machine systems that 
optimize human abilities while minimizing error, and raised workers' morale and 
motivation. 
How airport security companies structure the management of all the daily work 
experiences of its security checkpoint screeners has a dominate influence on the 
performance of those screeners. Precise personnel selection and training are 
consequential, indeed critical, for airport security organizations. "But no matter how 
perfectly the company performs these operations, if the organization is badly 
structured, performance in the long run, will be poor" (Yorks, 1976, p. 3). It is 
important to remember that security checkpoint screening is the element of aviation 
security most familiar to the traveling public. How a screener acts, looks, and 
communicates are all critical to a security system's effectiveness. The human element 
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in the security checkpoint process will remain paramount. It takes specific abilities and 
personality to be a successful screener. According to Wallis (1993) the performance of 
a checkpoint security screener (at the interface with the traveling public) can be judged 
to an extent, by the passengers. The general attitude of the checkpoint security 
screener is easy to detect. Personal presentation and appearance is readily observable. 
Since aviation security is based on multiple layers of overlapping effort, it is 
highly dependant on each of the participants carrying out their individual 
responsibilities. The security screening checkpoint is a team effort that requires 
cooperation and excellent communications between everyone involved. The 
responsibility for establishing an effective and integrated aviation security program is 
shared by the air carriers, the airports, and the FAA. Thaher (1991) notes that in 1990 
the FAA spent $10 million on the development of new passenger screening, explosive 
and explosive devices and baggage inspection technology. To date, however, there has 
been little emphasis and attention placed on the recruiting and motivating of airport 
security checkpoint screeners. The success and deterrent potential of the security 
system is primarily dependent on the personnel who operate it. Fundamental attributes 
of screener success are determined by human factor issues. Performance issues and 
retention and attrition factors all have significant roles in the aviation security arena. 
Whether it be the safety of passengers and crew, the cost in training, or the success rate 
among airport security checkpoints in detecting weapons, each impinge upon the 
general concept of employee job satisfaction. 
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In addition, an effective national aviation security checkpoint screening program 
is based on adequate FAA guidance in the selection of screeners and in their training, 
as well as on the importance that individual airlines place on security. The security 
checkpoint screener must be able to effectively operate security equipment under 
varying workload conditions, (e.g., during peak periods when passengers are in a 
hurry, airport "rush hours", etc.). As with most safety-critical systems, there is no 
room for system-induced or operator-induced errors. Human factors issues (high 
turnover, low pay, hiring problems, and poor training) have plagued the larger airports 
particularly. Moore (1991) notes that motivation is a highly significant problem. 
Situations are handled all to often by negative reinforcement rather than positive 
reinforcement. These human factor issues are a prolific area for research, and much 
needs to be done to allay the job satisfaction and motivation problems these screeners 
encounter. The selection process of those persons who have the necessary attributes for 
target detection or abnormalities are relatively unexplored. In addition, one of the 
trends that has developed in the airport security industry is that the air carriers are using 
the contract security officers for duties other than predeparture screening. The logic 
for this is purely economic reasons. Contract security employees are utilized for 
international greeters, for pushing wheel chairs, and for monitoring the security of 
incoming and out going baggage (Moore, 1991). Although this provides a variety for 
the security checkpoint screener and makes the job more interesting (to some), it does 
require the necessary attributes, personality traits, attitudes, and motivation. 
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Predictive modeling of potential security checkpoint screeners is a key in 
screening for the appropriate candidates. The implications for cost savings in training 
and reduced turn-over are enormous. This suggests that it may be useful to use expert 
modeling for the determination of how successful security checkpoint screeners process 
information and arrive at a desirable level of competency. Understanding how 
successful security screeners think and perform will aid in establishing a selection and 
training guideline. Although individual differences are difficult to identify and 
quantify, the identification of satisfiers and motivators in successful screener operations 
can prove to be beneficial. The study of these can aid in the optimum performance 
model. Research proves that companies that satisfy employees' desires for good 
managerial relations, respect, fair and adequate compensation, and offer opportunities 
for growth and development through training, are reaping the benefits. 
The President's Commission (1990) on Terrorism and Aviation Security 
concluded that the FAA paid little attention to the recruitment, training, and motivation 
of the aviation security work force. The agency was further criticized for not 
integrating the work force with modern technology to achieve a systems approach to 
security. At hearings before the Commission on February 2, 1990, it was pointed out 
to FAA officials that studies of human factors issues in security was visibly absent from 
the agency's research and development effort, despite human factors affiliated 
recommendations unfurled over a decade earlier. 
In 1978, following inadequate test results of the security screening process, a 
task force of the FAA and airline security personnel studied ways to improve 
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performance at airport security screening checkpoints. This task force's report, 
referred to as the Human Factors Study, recommended several actions which were 
endorsed by both the FAA and the airlines. For the most part, these recommendations 
focused on the personnel-related aspects of the operation such as high employee 
turnover rates, low pay, and insufficient training. Although the FAA and the airline 
industry endorsed the study's recommendations, the air carriers have been slow in fully 
implementing them (GAO, July, 1987). In fact, in July 1987, the GAO reported to .the 
Secretary of Transportation that an investigation of screening processes at six major 
airports found that many of the problems that were addressed in the 1978 human 
factors study still existed. For example, security firm managers reported that airport 
security screening personnel were still being paid at, or near, minimum wage and that 
low pay contributes to high-turnover rates (in some cases, 100 percent annually) and 
further resulted in problems in hiring capable people. 
Statement of the Problem 
The human element in the security checkpoint process is and will remain 
paramount. Acts of unlawful interference are not everyday occurrences and the 
likelihood of a security checkpoint screener actually being in a situation to thwart a 
tragedy is exceptionally unlikely. This prompts a principal motivation to be missing. 
The checkpoint security screener must be able to effectively operate the safety-critical 
system with 100 percent detection rates despite the fact that the actual task of the 
checkpoint is highly routine and a potentially boring job. Job training, recurrent 
training, and longevity on the job all play an important role on job performance in the 
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low pay contributes to high-turnover rates (in some cases, 100 percent annually) and 
further resulted in problems in hiring capable people. 
Statement of the Problem 
The human element in the security checkpoint process is and will remain 
paramount. Acts of unlawful interference are not everyday occurrences and the 
likelihood of a security checkpoint screener actually being in a situation to thwart a 
tragedy is exceptionally unlikely. This prompts a principal motivation to be missing. 
The checkpoint security screener must be able to effectively operate the safety-critical 
system with 100 percent detection rates despite the fact that the actual task of the 
checkpoint is highly routine and a potentially boring job. Job training, recurrent 
training, and longevity on the job all play an important role on job performance in the 
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parameters within which the air carrier will have to plan are those laid down in the 
carrier's own national legislation. The regulations of the countries the airline goes to 
will also have to be included to ensure the air carrier complies with the requirements of 
en route airports. 
Air carriers' security branches vary in size and complexity. Some air carrier 
security operations are very large while others use just a handful of personnel to staff 
the airports they serve. "At the start of the 1990s, American Airlines claimed to be • 
employing more than a thousand security personnel" (Wallis, 1993, pg. 80). At the 
time of this writing, there were over 15,000 screeners employed by some 46 security 
firms nationwide. Most air carriers look to their government's security agencies to 
collect information and consequently take appropriate actions to respond to this 
information. The air carriers evaluate the risk opposing their operation, making crucial 
decisions and staffing manpower accordingly. Air carrier operations must be 
adequately flexible to meet the varying conditions that are entailed within the operation. 
Regulatory Background 
In December 1972, air carriers were given 30 days to institute a program of 100 
percent screening of all passengers and carry-on luggage. Part 121.538, the rule 
affecting security by air carriers, was issued on January 31, 1972, and required each 
certificate holder to adopt and implement a screening program. Thirty days later the 
order was amended to require each air carrier to submit its screening program to the 
FAA. The air carrier is held responsible by the FAA for the effectiveness of screening 
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procedures, and for developing security plans which assure prevention or deterrence of 
aircraft hijacking, sabotage, and related criminal acts. 
Few air carrier operations were staffed with enough personnel to accommodate 
the increased labor burden these new screening requirements required. "No one was 
certain how long these requirements would last; it would not be good management to 
hire a considerable number of new employees only to let them go six months later if 
the requirements were canceled" (Moore, 1991, pg. 91). These factors have forced • 
most air carrier operations to go to outside contract screening companies. Whether an 
air carrier decides to contract the required screening relies on a variety of 
circumstances. Among these circumstances, cost remains the primary factor (Moore, 
1991). In addition to cost, another advantage to hiring an outside contractor is the 
internal flexibility the air carrier operator is given. For example, the air carrier 
operator is relieved of hiring or firing employees, scheduling vacations, handling pay 
raises and the scheduling of shifts. The downside to the subcontract passenger and 
security screening companies is that "...these companies unfortunately have had a 
record of seeking to maximize the profit potential of their contracts by hiring staff at 
minimum wage levels and by providing the most elementary training" (Wallis, 1993, 
pg. 49). The performance standards consequently fall considerably short of what is 
expected and required. The aviation industry, more specifically the airlines, have been 
accused of a penny-pinching attitude toward security (St. John, 1991). 
The FAA Act of 1958 was amended to implement the convention for the 
suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft. This Act (Public Law 93-366) was 
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enacted by the House of Representatives and Senate of the United States Congress. It 
was signed by the President on August 5, 1974, and contained two acts; the Anti-
hijacking Act of 1974 and the Air Transportation Act of 1974. The Air Transportation 
Act of 1974 requires that "...all passengers and all property intended to be carried in 
the aircraft cabin in interstate air transportation be screened by weapon-detecting 
procedures or facilities employed or agents of the air carrier." 
Section 315 of the General Aviation Act directs the FAA to prescribe • 
regulations requiring the screening of all passengers and carry-on items for the presence 
of unauthorized items. Section 316 of the Act also requires regulations to protect 
persons and property aboard aircraft from acts of criminal violence and piracy. A 
certificate holder is an airplane operator subject to FAR-107 (regulations covering 
airport operator security) and FAR-108 (regulations covering aircraft operator 
security), and is engaged in scheduled passenger or public charter passenger operations, 
or both. Air carriers are responsible for developing and implementing security plans 
which pledge prevention or deterrence of aircraft hijacking, sabotage, and related 
criminal acts (i.e., the carriage of any explosive, incendiary, or a deadly or dangerous 
weapon). Each air carrier security operation is governed by a document referred to as 
the Air Carrier Standard Security Program (ACSSP) which is approved by the FAA. 
The airport operators are to provide law enforcement support to screen and maintain 
security programs which deter and hinder unauthorized entry into air operations areas 
(Federal Aviation Administration, 1991). 
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After the tragedy of Pan Am 103, the President's Commission on Aviation 
Security and Terrorism was formed on August 4, 1989, by Executive Order 12686 
(President's Commission, 1990). The Commission's goal was to conduct a 
comprehensive study and appraisal of the practices and policy options to prevent 
terrorist acts against civil aviation. The President's Commission Report (1990) 
emphasized the significance of having a consistent set of selection and training 
standards for airport security and was demonstrated by the Pan Am 103 investigation. 
In addition, the investigation suggested that the security weaknesses found could be 
connected to breakdowns in airline security personnel performance. For example, the 
investigation found that Pan Am security personnel failed to properly screen 38 
passengers at London's Heathrow airport. 
Currently, the FAA has initiated several programs to counter terrorist threats. 
The FAA sponsors aviation security training programs at the Transportation Safety 
Institute (TSI) in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma under the authority of Section 316 (c) of 
the Federal Aviation Act of 1958. The current programs relating to aviation safety and 
security are administered by the Aviation Security Division of TSI (Federal Aviation 
Administration, 1991). In its security program the FAA identifies the core 
requirements and guidance for the initial, recurrent, and on-the-job training of airline 
screening personnel at domestic airports. Despite the FAA's efforts to standardize 
security training programs, several task forces and studies have found that the quality 
of security screener training provided by the airlines and contracting security firms 
varies widely between and within an airline (President's Commission, 1990). 
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Passenger Serening 
One of the fundamental elements of the aviation security system is passenger 
screening. By requiring passengers to pass through a security checkpoint for the 
inspection of their personal and carry-on items, it is possible to establish a sterile area 
in which there are no unauthorized weapons, explosive devices, and/or other objects or 
devices that could be used to harm or threaten aircraft, air carrier personnel, or 
passengers. Studies conducted by United Airlines during the early stages of the 
predeparture screening program found that there was an average of 1.2 bags per 
passenger. Wallis (1993) notes that enormous sums are expended on security 
checkpoint screening staff and are largely wasted in the since that the level of the 
screeners performance is inadequate to offset any act of unlawful interference. As 
stated previously, the airlines bid out security contracts to security companies and 
usually the lowest bid is awarded the contract. "One natural element of such a bid is a 
low wage for the staff" (Wallis, 1993, p. 127). Consequently, the caliber of security 
personnel hired under such conditions correlates to the wage structure and falls far 
short "... of that needed for the function" (Wallis, 1993, p. 128). Although air carriers 
spend large sums on security checkpoint screening personnel by way of agency 
contracts, there is little cost effectiveness that is associated with this activity. Only 65 
cents per passenger ticket goes toward security, in contrast to the passenger facility 
charge which can top out at $3.00 per passenger ticket. These restricted means affect 
the quality of the equipment obtainable as well as the quality of personnel selection, 
training, and benefits. "The last thing airlines want to consider is spending more 
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money for security. What they do not seem to realize is that security must be a 
component part of their service, just like on-time flights, safety, and passenger 
satisfaction" (Vosburgh, 1993, p.6.). McKinnon (1986) notes that there has been some 
cost-vs-benefit ratio discussions in terms of dollars. See Table 1 for an example in 
1985 of security costs effecting the airlines: 
Tahlel- Security Costs Effecting Airlines (1985) 
* $74, 794 per firearm detected 
•** $155,642 per related arrest 
+ $19,821, 605 per hijacking or related 
crime believed to have been prevented 
Despite this, the threat of being screened before entering a sterile area and the fear of 
related security measures in effect have eliminated thousands of potential crimes and 
hijackings. 
Passenger screening today is accomplished with metal detectors, X-ray machines 
and bag checks. Improved technological machinery has been and is currently being 
developed and upgraded as an aid in the detection of weapons. Guns, knives, and hand 
grenades are favorite weapons of hijackers. These devices can usually be detected with 
X-ray equipment (the output of an X-ray machine is a visual image of the object being 
examined). Even attempts to mask or hide such items can usually result in their 
identification using X-ray equipment. Haas (1976) notes that X-ray devices are the 
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only practical means today of providing an interpretable visible image of objects and 
their contents with non-destructive penetrating radiation. However, the actual job task 
of X-ray screening can be very monotonous requiring both motivation and a positive 
mental attitude. 
The effectiveness of X-ray screening depends upon the skill of the operator in 
recognizing the objects that are displayed on the X-ray monitor and proper techniques 
to screen a person entering the sterile area or a screener providing a bagcheck to a bag 
entering the sterile area. Detecting unauthorized weapons, explosive devices, and/or 
other objects or devices that could be used to harm or threaten aircraft, air carrier 
personnel or passengers is extremely difficult for even highly trained technicians. Most 
airport security personnel are not highly trained and not all people can be trained. 
Although checkpoint screeners are, for the most part, extremely conscientious some 
may have inherent weaknesses. Low wages draw two types of social classes to the job. 
The first social class is the undereducated, and less experienced. These people have 
trouble getting a higher paying job because of their lack of education, lack of working 
skills and experience, scarcity of jobs, and/or interests in security work. Aubrey and 
Felkins (1989) note that education has been shown to increase employee needs for 
greater influence in the work place. The second class is the older population who is 
more interested in passing time, being around people, flexible job hours, enjoying their 
co-workers, and who do not consider money an important role in the selection of the 
job. Moore (1991) states that many of the more effective security screeners are older 
adults, and they tend to be long term employees. Guide (1991) notes that the 
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physiological literature indicates that there usually are physical decrements in vision, 
audition, cognitive processing, vigilance, and memory with increasing age. The 
physiological and psychological effects are an essential everyday part of the screening 
task. 
A high percentage of the security checkpoint screeners have never held or even 
seen a real explosive device in their lifetime. Their ability to detect an obvious threat 
is based upon the training they receive and the test objects they see most frequently. • 
Some obvious threats, such as a pipe bomb, grenade, gun, knife, and handcuff are easy 
to detect because they have distinctive shapes and are very dense so they show up well 
on an X-ray. These items are easy to detect regardless of their orientation, profile, 
angle, and/or location, unless they are masked by an opaque object. If this is the case, 
the X-ray image appears as a possible threat and should be bag checked. On the other 
hand, some obvious threats such as time bombs, dynamite bombs, and plastic bombs 
can be extremely difficult to detect and are frequently missed during tests. These 
objects are not dense and can be penetrable on the X-ray image. In addition, these 
objects are not only difficult to detect when they are isolated, but they are even more 
difficult to detect when cluttered by other objects. Training is a paramount issue in the 
detection process. 
Theoretical Basis 
Experts agree that security checkpoint screeners must develop and maintain a 
high degree of proficiency at their work. The detection of any explosive, incendiary, 
or deadly or dangerous weapon in individual carry-on or checked in baggage is a 
21 
continuously changing equation that presents multidisciplinary security challenges (e.g., 
vigilance, scanning, prediction, and knowledge of materials). Haas (1976) noted that 
the usefulness of X-ray equipment is only starting to be comprehended. There are few 
other practical ways which are used to inspect carry-on or checked articles of 
passengers. These are especially effective ways "...which do not significantly invade 
people's privacy" (Funke, 1992, p.30). The detection of dangerous weapons from 
obscure X-ray images of all types of baggage relies heavily on the skill of a screener! 
Funke (1992, p.30) stated, "Little attention has been given to this critical human 
component although it represents a critically weak link in the airport security system". 
The FAA's testing of the effectiveness of the screening process is relatively 
unsophisticated. The agency historically utilizes test weapons, such as simulated pipe 
bombs, three sticks of simulated dynamite tied together with a large clock and attached 
wires, encapsulated hand guns, and dead grenades to test the x-ray equipment and the 
ability of the operator to detect a potentially lethal weapon. The test object is generally 
placed in a briefcase or bag with little or no effort to conceal, clutter, or disguise it. 
The briefcase or bag is then taken by the FAA inspector posing as a passenger to enter 
the sterile area. The FAA inspector enters the screening point and is submitted to the 
screening process. One would expect near 100% detection rates since the FAA test 
objects resemble only very obvious threats and since the FAA inspectors are not 
allowed to hide the test object(s) into the carry-on baggage (GAO, 1987, July). In 
addition, airport security checkpoint screeners are often aware that they are being tested 
because: a) FAA inspectors are well known to screeners at most airports, and b) 
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screening teams look out for each other and signal the presence of the FAA inspector to 
other members of the team. One investigator (Vosburgh, 1993) notes that this 
approach is not very practical. Most screeners "...would probably not recognize a real 
bomb [or threat] since they train primarily to identify test objects similar to those used 
during airline and FAA tests" (Vosburgh, 1993, p.61). 
Moore (1991) notes the importance of developing innovative ways to improve 
the system operator's effectiveness that should always remain a high priority. Studying 
checkpoint screener needs and social conditions are two ways to improve motivation 
and job satisfaction, hence, positively influencing job performance. Numerous human 
factors issues (i.e., lighting and glare, floor grade, work station design, ambient noise 
levels, the seating provided for the screening position, the effect of night work and 
circadian rhythms on screening performance, the need for training of handling and 
lifting heavy loads, and provide good management training to supervisors) can 
adversely impact screener performance and reduce the efficiency of the overall security 
procedures. Poor work environments may also induce fatigue and may affect personnel 
retention. Supporting this concept, Astley and Fox (1975) noted that providing an 
improved working environment — as a result of physical changes (e.g., economically 
designed chairs, padded floormats) — will influence personnel turnover and absenteeism 
in a positive direction. 
The President's Commission (1990) noted that the FAA had failed to include 
human factors considerations in integrating new technology and training. The FAA's 
approach was found to be reactive rather than proactive. Changes were mandated to 
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unite human factors into the overall design and management of the security system. 
The FAA had failed to consider the human factors involved in aviation security, 
particularly those factors in the security checkpoint screener position. The human 
factors approach is to improve the security checkpoint screener performance. In 
addition to using the human factors approach there are other ways to improve human 
performance. These are: (a) select of new personnel who are less likely to make 
errors than the current personnel; (b) improve training so that everybody's level of • 
performance is improved; (c) motivate the security checkpoint screener to perform 
better; and (d) change the social consequences of making an error. It is important that 
the employee maintain at least the "...the average level and quantity of output and learn 
to perform his task at a satisfactory rate, effective operation also requires that these 
duties be performed regularly and faithfully" (Beaumont, 1945, p. 17). ICAO has also 
identified areas in aviation security requiring attention. These include: (a) low wages; 
(b) lack of career prospects; (c) lack of challenge in the job; (d) lack of authority; (e) 
poor working hours; (f) pressure from the airlines to perform during peak hours; (g) 
fear of possible health effects (e.g., bomb detonation, sore backs from lifting luggage, 
and radiation exposure); (h) penalties for poor performance; and (i) lack of sufficient 
knowledge to handle dangerous situations (e.g., armed passengers, and explosive 
devices). 
To make the overall security system work best, in the effective identification of 
weapons and contrab, efforts must be made to improve both human performance and 
technology. For the security checkpoint screener operator, learning is a paired process 
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consisting of the acquisition of the required responses and inhibition of competing ones. 
Unfortunately, error is a necessary part of learning. The ultimate improvement in 
security checkpoint screening effectiveness would come from a fully automated security 
screening system which would include artificial intelligence applications. The day may 
come when security screening is fully automated, but it will not be soon. Hughes 
(1993) noted that a key conclusion of the latest National Research Council study is that 
there is no single detection technology available today that can provide a high 
probability of bomb or weapon detection. 
Training Issues 
Most of the emphasis has been allocated towards technology and little has been 
directed towards the enhancement of human performance. A precisely trained and 
extremely motivated operator combined with advanced technology can be effective in 
screening for obvious and potential threats. The Conference Board Inc. (1971) notes 
that if jobs lack motivational content, material and human resources alike are under 
utilized. Training does not have to occur in a formal situation or a classroom. It can 
take place in a meeting one on one with a supervisor or in a conversation with a teacher 
or a facilitator. A successful training program should improve the moral of the 
employees as evidenced by greater devotion to duty, accelerated learning rates, 
decreased absenteeism, fewer complaints, and a smaller labor turnover. 
While there are many physical techniques designed to make the job easier and 
more effective, security checkpoint screeners cannot and should not be entirely 
eliminated from the system. Training is needed to confirm that the operator remains 
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cognizant of the prevailing technology and demands required on the job. Training 
renders a solution in the reduction of errors and skill development. "A properly trained 
and highly motivated operator, combined with suitable screening enhancement tools can 
be very effective in screening for dangerous objects. This is why the need to develop 
innovative ways to improve the system operators' effectiveness should always remain a 
priority" ("Keeping the Operator", 1992, p. 41). Senders and Moray (1991) note that 
well-trained operators whose knowledge and skill are appropriate to the task will make 
fewer errors than unskilled operators. Motivation can be developed and maintained by 
good system design, both in the human machine interface and the working policies. 
Senders and Moray (1991) note if training and psychology are relied on to reduce 
error, then one must start by adopting a different attitude towards errors. In addition, 
one can regard error only as a clue to the processing system in the central nervous 
system that are responsible for the behavior. Training can be improved by a 
combination of both formal and on the job training conducted on an on going basis. 
Not all people can be trained, however. Some individuals may possess inherent 
weaknesses. The conceivable efficiency of security personnel should be considered at 
the time of hiring. Wallis (1993) elucidates that training and refresher training should 
strive at ensuring the personnel understand precisely what items they are seeking and 
how to identify the components on the x-ray monitor. People who are less likely to 
make errors should be selected as a security checkpoint screener to provide the needed 
security level. On the other hand, Senders and Moray (1991) note that personnel 
selection is not a very powerful method of improving systems. The Civil Rights Act 
states that an employer can not discriminate between race, age, and gender. Well 
trained staff are key to an effective security program and is a positive alternative to 
personnel selection. Standards are paramount if the security arena is to be successful in 
preventing additional attacks against the civil aviation industry. "Implementation of 
these provisions requires highly trained staff at all levels, and the training of security 
personnel should be considered a high priority" (Sutherland, 1992, p.6). Training 
should improve the operator skills and retention levels. • 
The actual tasks of the airport security checkpoint personnel are highly routine 
and provide the elements for a boring and dry job. With boredom comes inefficiency. 
Wallis (1993) notes that boredom and complacency from the checkpoint job task have 
to be met with effective man-management routines. Senders and Moray (1991) 
emphasize that people can be trained to perform better, not necessarily to make fewer 
errors. Shields and Maddox (1991) note that training can reduce workload at the same 
time that it improves performance, and it can assist the individual in meeting the task 
demands. Along with training Wallis (1993) notes that once a security checkpoint staff 
has been engaged, their management becomes a fundamental ingredient in the security 
process. 
Current Training Methods 
Most screeners are trained with obvious test items, and are only instructed on 
complete explosive items and not their components. Assessments by ICAO of the 
security situation of some 34 countries confirms that deficiencies are characteristic due 
mainly to the inadequacy of training practices. A program that recognizes the 
individual and the diverse characteristics of states has been designed to meet the needs 
and to improve the effectiveness and cost-efficiency of adequate civil aviation training 
in the developing world. "The content of the ICAO training program for aviation 
security, in the form of standardized training packages (STPs) is based on an objective 
analysis of the tasks to be performed and the skills and knowledge required to perform 
them" (Sutherland, 1992, p.6). The training requirements effect all levels of 
personnel. For example, the Basic Airport Security Personnel Training Course has 14 
modules and activities. Among a list of 14 modules and activities that are provided 
are: (a) 9 hours of training for passenger screening and physical search of passengers; 
(b) 8 1/2 hours of training for X-ray examination of baggage; and (c) 5 1/4 hours of 
Physical inspection of baggage. The course has the duration of 12 working days, of 
which 75 percent involves formal class room instruction and 25 percent involves 
simulated practice exercises and field events. Sutherland notes that upon finishing 
AVSEC 123/Basic, the trainees will be capable of performing the following tasks: (a) 
work and move in and about an airport facility; (b) communicate and cooperate with 
other airport agencies; (c) control the movement of people and vehicles by means of 
access control techniques and systems; (d) guard and patrol airport vulnerable areas, 
facilities and aircraft; (e) recognize weapons and explosive/incendiary devices; (f) 
inspect, screen and search passengers and baggage; (g) respond to airport emergency 
situations; and (h) escort people and consignments. "This Program will assist in 
meeting the present human resource training requirements of the world wide aviation 
community" (Sutherland, 1992, p. 7). ICAO recommends that airport security 
checkpoints should be manned by teams of people who are capable and able to rotate 
their functions on a twenty-minute cycle. Five persons working as a single unit can be 
sorted into different stations as to provide peak security performance and traffic flow. 
The five positions are as follows: one person to direct the flow of passengers; another 
to monitor the x-ray screen; a third person, to hand search baggage and components 
entering the sterile area that have been selected during the X-ray process for further 
examination; a forth to control the flow of traffic through the magnetometers; and a • 
fifth security checkpoint personnel to manually frisk people who alarm the 
magnetometer. A rotation system minimizes the boredom and provides a variety and 
an all-around understanding of the total security checkpoint task (Wallis, 1993). Job 
rotation not only gives the employee a broader prospective, but it also increases skills 
and knowledge about the job and it provides a variety that relieves boredom. 
The training manual published by the Air Transportation Association of 
America, makes it clear to new checkpoint security screeners during their initial 
training that there is a direct relationship between appearance and effectiveness. A 
checkpoint security screener's actions, appearance, and speech must project the 
seriousness of the screening process at all times. It is in the airline's best interest to 
hire an adequate staff; screeners must not operate in a manner that could jeopardize the 
public's expectations of a professional screener. For obvious reasons, a screener 
cannot afford to appear inattentive or un-wary in the conduct of their duties and 
responsibilities. Staff attentiveness is equally visible. The individual is the key link in 
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the passenger security screening process which remains an important part of a proven 
civil aviation security system. 
Research on Training to Improve Screener Performance 
Funke (1979) analyzed a study in 1975 accomplished by Potter. In this study he 
examined the ability of perceptual training techniques on developing the skill of 
detecting weapons for screeners. Data was obtained from 18 subjects. All were high 
school graduates and 9 were college students. Subjects were randomly assigned to one 
of three groups: Group 1 was trained with sound and slide presentations dealing with 
explosives; Group 2 was trained with an audio and visual program on guns; and Group 
3 (the control group) was trained with written instructions concerning items they 
should watch for during visual inspections. Subjects were shown 95 slides of x-rayed 
baggage of which approximately 30% contained various weapons. Subjects were to 
express whether they thought the bag required opening, and if so the reason for their 
decision. The slides were shown for 6 seconds followed by a 4 second vacant period. 
Three measures of performance were investigated: (a) number of bags 
containing weapons which were missed; (b) number of carry-ons which were 
incorrectly identified (false alarm) as containing weapons; (c) number of bags correctly 
identified as containing weapons, however, the weapons themselves were misidentified. 
The number of carry-ons incorrectly identified and the number of carry-ons that had 
misidentified weapons were not significantly related to the training conditions. In spite 
of this, the type of training had a significant effect on the number of weapons found, 
although no statistical data was accounted for by Funke (1979). These findings 
mdicated that perceptual training techniques (e.g., sound and slide presentations can 
significantly improve target identification on visual inspection tasks, particularly when 
targets appear infrequently (Funke 1979). The support data for these findings for the 
three groups is as follows: (a) the mean percentage of the weapons missed for 
explosive trained (mean = 10.0); (b) the mean percentage of the weapons missed for 
gun trained (mean = 22.6); and (c) the mean percentage of the weapons missed for 
the control group (mean = 32.8). 
Computer-Based Instruction Training 
Nadler and Mengert (1993) researched the advantages of computer-based 
instruction (CBI) compared to present methods of selection, training, and screener 
certification. They utilized a system developed specifically for airline security 
checkpoint screeners (Safe Passage System). The Safe Passage System shows airport 
security checkpoint screeners x-rayed carry-on images stored in a video database of 
approximately 2,000 images. The images depict eight categories: (a) innocent; (b) 
suspicious innocent; (c) electronic innocent; (d) explosive; (e) gun; (f) knife; (g) 
other sharp objects; and (h) combined/other weapons. The research team collected 
data from 1,465 screeners who worked for security companies at five major domestic 
airports equipped with the Safe Passage System. 
The initial findings (reported in their interim report) were based on data from 
500 screeners referred to as their Sample Data Set. Airport security checkpoint 
screeners performed simulated screening tests while threat images were presented in 
random intervals. Three levels of competence were programmed into each test 
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containing 12 different images (i.e., low, medium, high). This enabled the test to have 
each level contain increasing percentages of relatively difficult test images: 25, 50, 
and 75 %, respectively. The researchers went on to note that four of the eight image 
categories (i.e., suspicious innocent, explosive, knife, and other sharp object) portrayed 
accuracy levels less than 80% in the Low Proficiency Level, accounting for accuracy 
levels of percent, 77.4 %, 76.8 %, and 77.3 %, respectively. Hence the images that 
fall into these categories are prevalent to be more difficult to detect. Preliminary 
conclusions also indicate a low percentage of critical errors (i.e., errors resulting when 
a screener passes a carry-on that should have been held for further inspection). In 
addition the research team found that 50% committed no critical errors at each 
proficiency level. Based on the this preliminary data, Nadler and Mengert (1993) 
concluded that there is however, ample room for improvement in the screener's ability 
to distinguish threat items from innocent items in x-ray images of carry-on items. 
After analysis of this CBI system it can be concluded that it is the most advanced 
training program available on the market today. 
International Total Services (ITS) Study 
The aviation security contractor ITS investigated if there is a relationship 
between screener performance and certain employee characteristics. In 1993, the 
Training and Personnel Development Department at ITS completed research of 
demographic elements and their relationship to job longevity and performance on FAA 
checkpoint testing (ITS, 1993). ITS compared performance criterion for a sample of 
3,183 screeners divided into sub-groups by: (a) age; (b) sex; (c) ethnic background; 
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(d) educational level; (e) previous employment; (f) military background; and (g) 
citizenship. Although the constitution of the United States prevents using these results 
for employee selection and hiring, the findings are worthy to mention. 
During the study, significant differences were found when comparing screeners 
with three or more years tenure vs. nationwide airport security checkpoint screener 
population. High tenured screeners were on the average, older, better educated, more 
likely to be female, more likely from Asian than black ethnic background, and less • 
likely to possess U.S. citizenship (see Table 2). Nearly one-third of the high tenured 
Table 2- Comparison of Screeners Nationwide to Veteran Screeners (data from 
ITS Personnel Performance Study, 1993, Selection III: 
Employee Retention, Graph 1), 
Average age 
Female 
Asian 
Black 
U.S. Citizen 
Total Sample 
of Screeners (N = 3,183) 
38 years 
45.4% 
10.9% 
32.4% 
82.9% 
Screeners with ;> 3 
years 
54 years 
57.2% 
30.9% 
12.2% 
63.0% 
* The sample size of the veteran screeners was not reported 
sub-group were of Asian background (nearly equally divided by gender), with another 
17% Caucasian females. It is important to note that employment tenure was also found 
to be twice the duration for the housewife sub-group than any other prior work 
experience sub-group. The relationship between educational level and job tenure also 
has some findings worth mentioning. ITS found that airport security checkpoint 
screeners with four year college degrees and those with advanced college degrees have 
the two highest employment duration averages, respectively. It can be noted that the 
results presumably reflects the current poor outlook in the job market for college 
graduates and a work atmosphere that is appealing for retired professionals. It is 
interesting to note that demographic factors were not useful in differentiating screeners 
who remained employed less than 60 days from the total sample. The ability to identify 
screeners who do not perform effectively (i.e., fail FAA checkpoint tests) is of 
potentially significant importance. The data presented by the ITS study however, does 
not demonstrate a relationship between demographic issues and the number of FAA test 
failures over the proceeding 12-month period. The only substantial difference found is 
that the black subgroup is more likely to fail FAA tests than any other ethnic group. 
Several demographic factors distinguish superior performance in screeners (i.e., 
as determined by ITS security firm evaluations) from the total nationwide sample that 
were similar to the findings for the job tenure criteria. A set of 159 airport security 
checkpoint screeners were selected for special recognition because they "... showed an 
exceptional ability to repeatedly pass FAA tests." This selected set of screeners 
differed from the overall nationwide sample in: (a) mean age (51 years vs. 38 years); 
(b) gender (54% vs. 45% female); (c) ethnic background (50% vs. 24.2% 
Caucasian); (d) FAA pre-employment average test scores (98 vs. 93.5); 
(e) experience background (nearly a three-fold difference in prior military background 
and twice the percentage of the total sample with a law enforcement background). 
A Hierarchy of Motivations and Needs 
Abraham Maslow, a social scientist in the 1950's, developed a theory of how all 
motivations fit together. Maslow made sense of the assortment of human motives by 
arranging them in a pyramid, which he called a "hierarchy of needs". Wade and 
Tavris, 1990, note that Maslow's theory is immensely popular because it is intuitively 
logical and optimistic about human nature. There is, as it seems from past and present 
research, some uniformity to the seemingly capriciousness of employee wants. 
However, Maslow changed the pyramid rank of need over his life. This theory of 
motivation is the concept of a ''need hierarchy* in which humans are motivated by the 
various needs and can be positioned on a hierarchy of prepotency. These needs are at 
different levels. Maslow (1954) notes when a need is fairly well satisfied, the next 
prepotent (higher) need emerges, in turn to dominate the conscience life and to serve as 
the center of organization of behavior, since gratified needs are not active motivations. 
As one level of needs are satisfied, people are no longer motivated by them. People 
seek to satisfy the next higher level of needs. The hierarchy basically ascends from 
simple biological needs to complex psychological motives, culminating in self-
actualization. Maslow contests that needs must be met at each level before a person 
can think of the matters posed by the level above it. 
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A Self Actualization 
/ Esteem \ 
/ Belongingness \ 
/ and \ 
/ Love \ 
/ Safety \ 
/ Ph^o^, oeea, \ 
Figure 3. Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs 
Maslow's first level of hierarchy begins with the basic physiological needs as 
initially the most vigorous in the motivation of the organism and extends through until 
a variety of psychological needs (like eating and breathing) are satisfied. Once these 
basic psychological needs are satisfied, people pursue the next highest level (see Figure 
3). The basic biological motivations are generally found to be at a sufficient level of 
satisfaction so that the hierarchy lies within the various psychological and social needs 
of the individual. "The concept has led many people to feel that the worker can never 
be satisfied with his job" (Herzberg, Mausner, Snyderman, 1959, p. 110). The next 
highest level consists of security or safety needs. This is where salary, benefits, and 
job security function as a role in motivation. On the next level are social or affiliation 
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needs. After this level is the esteem level. Respect and recognition are motivational at 
this level. Lastly, the highest level of the hierarchy of needs is self actualization. 
Maslow articulates that a person cannot become self-actualized if he/she has not 
satisfied the need for self esteem. 
" Maslow's hierarchy of needs is important to us because it helps to explain why 
high salary, good benefits, and job security may not be as important as other 
motivational factors" (Cohen, 1990, p. 150). One problem with Maslows theory 
however, Wade and Tavris note (1990), is that it is possible to categorize human needs 
horizontally instead of vertically, thus portraying a structure that is not a hierarchy (see 
Figure 4). In addition, employees have simultaneous needs for basic physical comfort 
and safety. An individual can also have simultaneous needs for understanding self 
esteem and competence. Thus, each person can develop an individual hierarchy of 
motives. A combination of many motives are cultivated in a way that suits one's own 
personality and experiences. "Since each individual may present at any one time a 
different scramble of his psychological need list, a systematic personnel practice hoping 
to cater to the most pre-potent needs of its entire working force is defeated by the 
nature of the probabilities. Forgetting for a moment the individual 'need hierarchies' it 
can be argued that there is sufficient homogeneity within various groups of employees 
to make for a relative similarity of 'need hierarchies' within each group" (Herzberg, 
Mausner, Snyderman, 1959, p. 110). 
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Herzberg built upon Maslow1 s work and his studies conclude that people have 
two categories of needs which affect satisfaction and dissatisfaction with a job. 
Herzberg investigated job attitudes within employees in hundreds of companies and 
businesses, asking about events each had experienced at work which either had resulted 
in improvement in their job satisfaction or had induced a reduction in job satisfaction. 
In summary, two chief findings were derived from his studies. The factors involved in 
producing job satisfaction were separate and distinct from factors that prompted job 
dissatisfaction. According to Herzberg, five factors stand out as strong determinates of 
job satisfaction. These are achievement, recognition, work itself, responsibility, 
advancement (also see Figure 5). 
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According to Herzberg's findings, these five factors appeared very infrequently when 
the individual employees described events that paralleled job dissatisfaction feelings. 
The job dissatisfiers were similar to the job satisfiers in that they also had a 
unidimensional effect. See Table 3 for major dissatisfiers found in Herzbergs study 
were: 
Table 3. Herzbergs Major Dissatisfiers 
X company policy and administration 
X supervision 
X salary 
X interpersonal relations 
X working conditions 
X status 
X job security 
X personal life 
The dissatisfier factors describe the environment and serve primarily to prevent 
job dissatisfaction. Since these dissatisfiers have little effect on positive job attitudes, 
they have been named the hygiene factors. These needs represent the function of 
preventive medicine in the workplace and can never be completely satisfied. The 
employee must maintain these hygiene factors or he/she will lose performance. 
Herzsberg notes that although performance will not increase do to these hygiene 
factors, if an organization or individual is already performing well it, is possible to 
maintain these high standards with the hygiene factors. Motivators are in the second 
category because they are effective in motivating the individual to superior effort and 
performance (satisfying factors). Feelings of achievement, recognition for 
accomplishment, challenging work, increased responsibility, and growth and 
development are predominate in this second category. These are the factors that 
produce job satisfaction; fulfilling the hygiene needs will only prevent job 
dissatisfaction. 
Herzberg states that separate factors for job satisfaction and job dissatisfaction 
need to be considered and, thus, the two factors are not the obverse of each other. 
Hence, the opposite of job satisfaction would not be job dissatisfaction, but rather no 
job satisfaction; and the opposite of job dissatisfaction is not job satisfaction but rather 
no job dissatisfaction. Job satisfaction is mainly unipolar and contribute very little to 
job disatisf action. Conversely, job dissatisfiers contribute very little to job satisfaction. 
Herzberg's two factors can be utilized to motivate people to be satisfied with their jobs. 
For example, if hygiene factors are reduced (i.e., an employees salary) job 
dissatisfaction is going to increase. To avoid job dissatisfaction, hygiene factors must 
be maintained at their present levels. To increase job satisfaction, the job motivators 
must be increased. "The motivators are task factors and thus are necessary for growth; 
they provide the psychological stimulation by which the individual can be activated 
toward his self-realization needs" (Herzberg, 1966, p. 78). Both Herzberg's and 
Maslows perceptions of human motivation are largely interactive with the personal, 
egoistic and the self actualization needs (see Figure 6). 
Jnh Retention and Jnh Satisfaction 
According to Witt and Hellman (1991), emerging literature has demonstrated 
that proportionately more dissatisfied employees intend to leave their employing 
organization, while proportionately more satisfied employees intend to stay with their 
jobs. Satisfied workers have greater job longevity. Turnover itself has been examined 
quite extensively, and "... researchers have identified several antecedents of intent to 
leave: a) global job satisfaction, or total-facet job satisfaction (Horn, et al., 1979; 
41 
Self Actualization 
/C 
>  / \ A C 
Belongingness 
and Love 
Physiological 
Achievement 
Recognition iti V 
Work Itself 
\ 
Responsibili i t y \ 
Growth 
and Advancement 
\ 
Figure 6. A Comparison of the Motivational Theories 
of Maslow and Herzberg 
Kraut, 1975; Lachman & Aranya, 1986; Marsh & Mannari, 1977; Martin, 1979; 
Martin & Hunt, 1980; Mobley, et al., 1979; Price & Mueller, 1981; Shore & Martin, 
1989; Wright, 1982); b) group cohesiveness, job autonomy, and personal factors 
(Marsh & Mannari, 1977); c) supervisor related issues (Horn et al., 1979); d) 
jorganizational commitment (Blau & Boal, 1989; Lachman & Aranya, 1986); e) job 
involvement (Blau & Boal, 1989); f) workload (Jolma, 1990); g) burnout (Lachman & 
Diamant, 1987); and h) life status factors, such as age and tenure in the organization 
(e.g., Matin, 1979; Mobley, et al., 1978; Price & Mueller, 1981)" (Witt and Hellman, 
1991, p. 1). The most frequent antecedent of intent to leave is job satisfaction. Witt 
and Hellman conclude in their research that the intent to leave is conceptualized as an 
individual phenomenon. However, a frequent anecdote is the comparison of 
organizations as having employees with different levels of intentions to leave and 
commensurate turnover rates. "Research on job choice, career choice, and turnover 
clearly shows that the kind and level of rewards an organization offers influence who is 
attracted to work for an organization and who will continue to work for it" ( Lawler 
and Jenkins, 1992, p. 1012). Witt and Hellman (1991) note that Staw, Bell, and 
Clausen (1986) note that employees may bring a positive or negative disposition to. the 
work setting, process information about the job environment in a way that is consistent 
with that disposition, and then experience job satisfaction or dissatisfaction as an 
outcome. Witt and Hellman go on to state that it can be likely for an organization and 
organizational subsystems to engender different levels of job satisfaction and that this 
may affect the intent of an individual to leave; "...thus, to some extent it is a unit-level 
phenomenon" (Witt and Hellman, 1991, p. 6). Aggregation of individual job 
satisfaction enables prediction of organizational or subsystem intent to leave. 
An organization in which its employees are satisfied "...will acquire a 
reputation in its community as being a 'good place to work1" (U.S. Department of 
Labor, 1974, p. 23). People looking for jobs will tend to go to an organization with 
this kind of reputation as one of their first choices, rather than being an organization 
who receives its employees as a last resort. This is a problem with many security 
companies. "Having more qualified applicants, it can recruit its employees from the 
ranks of whom it wants, rather than from those it is forced to take. High productivity 
sic (100% detection) may thereby be achieved as a result of the company's ability to 
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hire qualified employees" (U.S. Department of Labor, 1974, p. 23). The U.S. 
Department of Labor (1974) notes Harold Wool in his article "What's Wrong With 
Work in America" (1973) by stating that a full employment condition can create a 
seller's market for available labor, thus, an organization is obligated to compete for the 
scarce labor available and therefore provides better wages, hours and working 
conditions. An employee who is not satisfied with a job may not come to work 
regularly or promptly. 
Predictors of Jnh Satisfaction 
Job satisfaction often seems like an ultimate, perhaps unattainable, goal for both 
managers and employees. According to Vroom (1964), a substantial amount of 
research has been done on job satisfaction and its predictors. The term "job 
satisfaction" refers to effective orientations on the part of individuals toward work roles 
which they are presently occupying. Job satisfaction is "...typically measured by 
means of interviews or questionnaires in which workers are asked to state the degree to 
which they like or dislike various aspects of their work roles" (Vroom, 1964, p. 100). 
Harris (1974) notes that early attempts to study job satisfaction as a predictor of job 
performance have proven to be confusing. Experimental trends in this area have 
emphasized studying job satisfaction as a dependent variable, (i.e., as a phenomenon 
worthy of studying and understanding in and of itself). These efforts have resulted 
mostly in job satisfaction being correlated with many other variables, both personal and 
environmental. Vroom continues to point out that there has been little standardization 
of job satisfaction measures. "Most investigators 'tailor-make' an instrument for the 
particular population they are studying" (Vroom, 1964, p. 100). Job satisfaction is 
composed of a complex set of variables that has different levels of satisfaction for 
different individuals. Vroom (1964) notes that the research indicates (and for practical 
purposes of this Thesis) that job satisfaction can be organized according to work role 
variables which have been thought to have an affect on job satisfaction (see Table 4). 
Table 4. Work Role Variables Affecting Job Satisfaction 
* 
V" supervision 
V the work group 
V job content 
/ wages 
/ proportional opportunities 
V" hours of work 
There is, in addition, the problem of defining job satisfaction operationally. Harris 
(1974) notes that Wanous and Lawler (1972) found nine different operational 
definitions of job satisfaction. "These definitions are really only different approaches 
to combining facets of the job which may contribute to job satisfaction, and, therefore, 
are not exhaustive or even identical in content" (Harris, 1974, p. 4). Many of the 
definitions of satisfaction imply different meanings of what is to be satisfied and are 
due to the different measures of job satisfaction that have been used (Harris, 1974). 
Supervision 
Vroom (1964) notes that Putnam (1930) notes that the Hawthorne works of the 
Western Electric Company, state that supervision is the greatest significant factor in 
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determining worker attitudes. Vrooms' research has lead him to believe that the 
"...relationship between first line supervisors and the individual workman is of more 
importance in determining the attitude, morale, general happiness, and efficiency..." of 
an employee than any other single factor (Vroom, 1964, p. 105). Quantitative 
evidence of supervision and the role it plays with employees is inconclusive. Vroom 
(1964) notes that Hertzberg, Mausner, Peterson, and Capwell (1957) have noted from 
15 studies where workers were asked what made them satisfied or dissatisfied with their 
jobs. Supervision was mentioned more frequently than security, job content, 
management, working conditions, and promotional opportunities. On the other hand, 
when supervision was mentioned as a source of dissatisfaction, it appeared fourth in the 
same list of job factors. Vroom (1964, p. 115) sums up the research pertaining to 
supervision and job satisfaction by noting that Pelz (1951) states that attempts by 
"...influential supervisors to help their subordinates achieve their goals will usually 
succeed and will results in higher employee satisfaction" 
The Work Group 
Developing an understanding of the characteristics of social interaction within 
groups which are satisfying and dissatisfying to the individual is a must. Vroom (1964) 
quotes Elton Mayo's statement, "Man's desire to be continuously associated in work 
with his fellows is a strong if not the strongest characteristic" (p. 119). Every 
successful work group must exchange rewards among themselves through interaction. 
Vroom (1964) notes that there is some data that suggests that workers' satisfaction with 
their jobs is related to opportunities of interaction with others on the job. Vroom goes 
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on to state that Kerr, Kopelmier and Sullivan (1951) found that departments which 
provide the least opportunity for conversations among its workers have the highest 
turnover rates. Vroom also points out that Sawatski (1951) notes that machine 
operators, who have restricted opportunity for communication, have a much higher 
turnover than employees' who do not operate machines. In this case, restricted 
communication is due to the work environment, and the area in which the employee 
works. This case is comparable to the hi-tech airport security checkpoints and warrants 
further investigation. Group attitudes and similarity stimulate satisfaction. Group 
acceptance is another variable that stimulates satisfaction. "If a person's acceptance by 
other group members affects the valence of the group for him, it should also affect the 
probability that he will withdraw from the group" (Vroom, 1964, p. 124). 
Joh Content 
Vroom (1964) notes that relatively little research has been carried out on the 
motivational consequences of job or task variables. Herzberg, Mausner, and 
Snyderman found that favorable job-content factors "..such as achievement and the 
work itself tend to produce satisfaction, but their absence does not tend to produce 
dissatisfaction "(Vroom, 1964, p. 128). Negative job-context factors (e.g., poor 
supervision or working conditions), on the other hand, tend to produce job 
dissatisfaction but their absence does not produce job satisfaction. Vroom goes on to 
note that Herzberg's own review (Herzberg, Mausner, Peterson, and Capwell, 1957) of 
the results of 155 studies involving over 28,000 employed personnel in which the 
employees were asked to denote what made them satisfied or dissatisfied with their jobs 
is not consistent with his previous findings that job content can produce job 
dissatisfaction but not job satisfaction. Vroom concludes Herzberg as noting that a 
total of five job-context issues (e.g., security, wages, supervision, social aspects of 
jobs, and working conditions) are more recurrently mentioned as contributing to job 
satisfaction rather than job dissatisfaction, and one issue that applies at least in part to 
job-content (e.g., opportunity for advancement) is more frequently mentioned as 
contributing to job dissatisfaction. 
Wages, Benefits, and Current Rates (Compensation Impact), 
Compensation is a crucial and eminent support system that will remain a leading 
influence to an employee's approach to the job environment. Compensation includes 
any direct or indirect payments to employees, such as wages, bonuses, stock, and 
benefits. According to Yorks (1976) research has demonstrated that salaries, and the 
form in which it is administered, are a sound influence on job behavior. 
Consequently, salaries emerge as a significant element in any structural approach 
toward enhancing employee effectiveness. Lawler (1981) articulates that the literature 
concerning pay and its role in organizational development has a potential impact on an 
organization and can play an important role in determining employee behavior. "How 
an organization structures its pay system tends to reinforce certain on-the-job behavior 
and communicate much to employees regarding management orientation toward them" 
(Yorks, 1976, p. 145). A change in the salaries offered, to overcome the deficiencies 
associated with the minimum wage syndrome where this applies, will enable a wider 
and better qualified labor market to be tapped (Wallis, 1993). Since security 
checkpoint personnel are not highly-paid, the selection process is proportionately more 
difficult and the qualifications for employment are not high, and legal standards are 
frequently even lower. Yorks (1976) points out one valid generalization which can be 
made about the relationship between pay and the enriching of jobs that is applicable to 
the security checkpoint screening job. Employees do not immediately ask for more 
money as their jobs are made more complete and as they are asked to accept more 
responsibility. An example of this is a security checkpoint screener, who has been • 
working for a number of months or years, who has not been promoted to a supervisor, 
but has taken on more responsibility. In addition, an interest in learning new 
responsibilities is the most typical response given by an employee. Groups of workers 
are more concerned with job changes and an opportunity for more interesting work than 
to accept the structural changes without an up-front guarantee of a pay increase (Yorks, 
1976). 
Compensation includes any direct or indirect payments to employees, such as 
wages, bonuses, stock, and benefits. Gerhart and Milkovich (1992) note that 
psychological theories typically specify that pay influences behaviors through its affect 
on perceptions and attitudes. Heneman (1985) hypothesized that pay satisfaction is a 
key attitude to be related to behaviors such as turnover and absenteeism. It is 
hypothesized to be a role of the incongruity between perceived pay and what the pay 
level should be. Gerhart and Milkovich (1994) note that Heneman (1985) cites 
research by Weiner (1980) showing that pay satisfaction does predict turnover. 
Furthermore, pay influences turnover only through the impact it has on pay 
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satisfaction. Salary can be classified as a hygiene factor. Herzberg (1966) states that 
salary is the most viable, communicable, advertised factor in all the world of work. In 
addition, he comments that hygiene factors are connected to salary. "Salary permeates 
the thoughts and expressions of people when they view their jobs. In such a 
circumstance, it is hardly surprising that salary often seems to be a satisfier to an 
individual, (Herzberg, 1966, p. 127). 
Reward Systems 
Achievement, recognition and responsibility are the most consistent motivational 
factors in producing job satisfaction (Herzberg, 1966). "These three describe 
accomplishment, reinforcement for accomplishment and increasing challenge -the basic 
ingredients of psychological growth" (Herzberg. 1966, p. 127). Pay can directly affect 
the success of job satisfaction in two ways. Yorks (1976) states that first, an 
employee's job has been enhanced, if significant changes in responsibility have 
occurred over time. Compensation will become an issue to an employee who verifies 
that he/she will make a contribution and be able to set and accomplish goals that he/she 
strive for. Second, Yorks states that"... the manner in which compensation is 
administered places pressure on managers and supervisors relative to the development 
of their employees" (Yorks, 1976, p. 147). Job satisfaction related to job withdrawal 
reactions such as turnover and absenteeism can be solved without deliberately setting 
out to increase job satisfaction (U.S. Department of Labor, 1974). According to the 
U.S. Department of Labor (1974), many theories state that good job performance leads 
to job satisfaction rather than job satisfaction leading to good job performance. 
50 
By combining a secure base pay with incentive or merit pay, special 
achievement employees can balance the intrinsic satisfactions of work with the extrinsic 
rewards of income and praise. Reward systems to stimulate attention of the security 
checkpoint job have proven effective in many airports (Wallis, 1993). Incentives tend 
to reinforce very specific behavior on the job. As the research indicates, an incentive 
program can lead to significant gains in productivity, and assists in the aspect of the 
employee doing the job that is expected. Pay is a powerful reinforcer and subtle . 
differences in emphasis can produce significantly different behaviors and attitudes. 
When rewards are focused on the basis of an employees performance, satisfaction is 
dependent on performance. The employees that perform the best represent an 
interesting retention problem. Lawler and Jenkins (1992) point out that to retain the 
best performers a "...reward system must distribute rewards in a way that will lead 
them to feel equitably treated when they compare their rewards with those received by 
individuals performing similar jobs at a similar level of performance in other 
organizations" (p. 1013). In this situation, external comparisons need to be emphasized 
because turnover means leaving a company for a more preferable situation at a different 
company. In addition, Lawler and Jenkins (1992) state that to be satisfied not only 
must the better performers in an organization receive more rewards than less adequate 
performers, they must receive significantly more rewards because, as the equity theory 
points out, the better performing employees feel that they deserve much more. 
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Motivation and the Rypertanry Theory 
Blinder, 1990; Lawler, 1971; Lawler and Jenkins, 1992; Nalbantain, 1987; and 
Vroom, 1964 convey that when certain delineated conditions exist, reward systems 
have been established to motivate performance. These conditions are distinctive in the 
"...extensive literature on the expectancy theory: Important rewards must be perceived 
to be tied in a timely fashion to effective performance" (Lawler and Jenkins, 1992 p. 
1013). "Performance motivation depends on the situation, how it is perceived, and Jhe 
needs of people" (Lawler and Jenkins, 1992 p. 1013). Employees are inherently 
neither motivated nor unmotivated to perform with competence. Cantor (1994) notes 
that the 3,000 or so weapons per year among billions of pieces of baggage (one in 
260,000 airline passengers) is a daunting challenge to the airline and the contract 
security companies responsible for safeguarding the flying public. "Adding to the 
challenge of the job itself is the high turnover among pre-departure screeners.. .more 
than 100% per year in some locations, owing to near minimum wages and local job 
markets" (Cantor, 1994, p. 61). 
Research shows that the Expectancy theory attributes the motivation decrement 
to an upward adjustment of the response criterion and puts forth candid observations 
about employee behavior. Detections are affected by the expectations of the operator. 
In fact, expectancy can have a positive effect on an employees motivation to perform in 
a certain way. "Every behavior has associated with it, in an individuals mind, certain 
outcomes (rewards or punishments)" (Lawler and Jenkins, 1992, p. 1014). Signal 
detection experiments also show that bias is affected by payoff. "If screeners are 
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rewarded for detections, being only human, they will say, 'I see it.' Hits will increase 
and so do false alarms" (Cantor, 1994, p. 64). If the Expectancy theory holds true for 
the security checkpoint screener, one might suspect that his/her motivation is prominent 
when: a) the security checkpoint screener believes that the behavior will lead to a 
certain outcome; b) the security checkpoint screener feels that these outcomes are 
appealing; and c) the security checkpoint screener believes that performance at a 
desired level is possible. If 10,000 carry-on bags in a row contain no threats, the . 
screener is relatively more likely not to detect a weapon when on really does come 
along. "Given a number of alternative levels of behavior, an individual will choose the 
level of performance that has the greatest motivational force associated with it, as 
indicated by a combination of the relevant expectancies, outcomes, and values" (Lawler 
and Jenkins, 1992, p. 1014). If any one of these elements is missing then there is no 
motivation. In addition, the Expectancy theory implies that satisfaction is best thought 
of as a result of performance rather than a cause of it (Lawler and Jenkins, 1992; 
Locke and Latham, 1990; and Porter and Lawler, 1968). The detection of a threat in 
an airport security checkpoint operation is an exercise in signal detection. Four 
possible outcomes are represented by the security screener: (a) if the screener notes a 
problem then there is either a threat present (hit) or no threat present (false alarm); (b) 
if the screener does not note a proble then there is either a threat present (miss) or no 
threat present (correct rejection). Wickens (1984) noted that simple instructions in 
company policy can adjust beta to an appropriate level. Knowledge of results can also 
adjust the level of response criterion. 
Turnover Issues 
It is important to acquire individuals who are efficient and will remain in the 
occupation with sufficient tenure to develop adequate expertise and experience. Guide, 
1991, notes that Salthouse, 1987, suggested that experience is a very important variable 
in moderating human performance and one that should be considered when attempting 
to examine any type of individual differences in behavior. Turnover issues have 
scourged airport security checkpoint security organizations especially at the larger • 
airports and costs the industry dearly. As previously stated, the occupation of airline 
passenger security screener is plagued by turnover rates that typically exceed 70% 
annually in most facilities. Air carriers are subject to civil penalties when contraband 
and incendiary deceives are not detected, many security companies react by terminating 
the responsible employee (Moore, 1991). One study by the U.S. Department of Labor 
noted that turnover was reliably forecast by a measure of job satisfaction and is 
instructive in directing attention away from overall job satisfaction to satisfaction with 
particular job aspects as predictors of turnover. The U.S. Department of Labor (1974) 
pronounced "...job dissatisfaction may be more likely to contribute to turnover when 
Ihe employee is single or otherwise not responsible with family responsibilities. The 
association between job satisfaction and turnover will depend to some extent on the 
turnover measure used and other mitigating circumstances" (p. 24). Lawler (1971) 
claims that organizations that give the most rewards tend to attract and retain the most 
people. High reward levels lead to a higher job satisfaction level, and in turn conveys 
lower turnover and more job applicants. "Individuals who are presently satisfied with 
their jobs expect to continue to be satisfied and, as a result, want to stay with the same 
organization" (Lawler & Jenkins, 1992, p. 1012). The correlation between 
dissatisfaction and turnover is likely to be stronger in periods of full employment. 
Turnover cannot be expected to rise and fall consistently with inclinations in job 
satisfaction because turnover trends are so strongly influenced by economic factors. 
The most obvious reaction of job dissatisfaction is leaving ones job. In 
addition, job absenteeism and job dissatisfaction are found to be related. However, Jike 
turnover, job absenteeism will or will not be related to job dissatisfaction depending on 
the absenteeism measure employed. According to Lawler and Jenkins (1992) research 
has shown that absenteeism and pay satisfaction are related, although the relationship 
between the two is not as strong as the relationship between pay satisfaction and 
turnover. Beaumont (1945) notes that even among workers who are skilled and 
efficient absenteeism may occur to cut down their total overall performance. 
Irregularity of attendance also tends to unfavorably affect moral and motivation of 
other workers and teammates. 
Several studies have shown that by utilizing pay bonuses and other rewards to 
pay attendance absenteeism can be reduced. Job satisfaction is best related to turnover 
and absenteeism in terms of cross-sectional indicators of job satisfaction of individuals 
rather than indicators of trends over time in job satisfaction (U.S. Department of Labor 
1974). Lawler (1981) points out that financial rewards can have a significant, even 
dominant effect on the attitudes, motivation, behaviors and performance of employees. 
Employees consider education, training, seniority, job performance, and the nature of 
their jobs when thinking about specific rewards that pertain to them. "There are often 
substantial differences among people as to which inputs they think should be most 
important in determining their rewards" (Lawler, 1981, P. 14). If an organization job 
environment is satisfying and high paying, individuals come to work regularly; if it is 
not than the employee will not. Reward systems are only one of several ways to 
influence turnover and absenteeism, however, a reward system is potentially effective if 
a company is willing to tie important rewards to coming to work. This is often mucii 
easier to do than utilizing a reward system with performance because attendance is 
easily measurable and it is very visible (Lawler & Jenkins, 1992). 
Job dissatisfaction and work-related problems can be grouped into three 
extensive types of causes. These are: a) the workers themselves (motivation, skills, 
etc.); b) their jobs; and c) the fit between what workers want and what their jobs 
provide. "Each type of causal assumption implies a distinctly different coarse of 
action" (U.S. Department of Labor, 1974, p. 31). If the problems source is attributed 
to the employees, some type of training or re-training is advised as a solution. 
"Attributing the problem to job characteristics implies that the appropriate solution is 
one that involves changing working conditions, while attributing the problem to the 
job-worker "fit" points in the direction of redistribution and reassignment" (U.S. 
Department of Labor, 1974, p. 31). The identification of such causes is not easy. If 
the problems source is attributed to the work environment, rather than the employee, 
distinguishing the particular aspects of an employee's job that are the cause and take 
subsequent action. This could range anywhere from salary, hours, management, and 
level of work. 
Scope of the Research 
The proficiency and effectiveness of retention and attrition factors can be 
achieved and evaluated by focusing upon employee job satisfaction and job 
dissatisfaction. The literature strongly suggests that there are parallel relationships 
between job satisfiers and dislikes that impact a security checkpoint screener's decisions 
to stay on, or leave the job. In fact, the literature points out that job satisfaction and 
turnover are negatively related to one another. It is clearly evident that within an 
airport security company (contracted by an airline) job retention and attrition factors 
among the personnel is exceptionally low and exceptionally high, respectfully. Job 
longevity is important in this kind of work environment to establish both the needed 
experience and qualifications of becoming a successful screener. The more satisfied an 
airport checkpoint security screener is towards his/her job the more likely he/she will 
remain on the job and the less probability of leaving. By identifying relevant satisfiers 
and dissatisfiers in this population of airport checkpoint security screeners it will be 
possible to pinpoint the causes of the retention and attrition problems that plague the 
airport security companies, and ultimately hurt the airlines. The identification of these 
relevant satisfiers and dissatisfiers will be able to dictate the use of methodologies that 
focus on the personnel that operate an airport checkpoint security system. 
Method 
The objective of the research is to solicit expert opinions from the SME's as to 
those job satisfiers in terms of a reason why screeners try to and want to stay on the 
job; and to those reasons to dislike the job or quit in terms of wanting to, or actually 
leaving the company. This phase of problem-solving research is often hurriedly passed 
through, so much that sometimes the results solve the wrong problem with the right 
solution. Thus, problem identification will be the main focus of this paper, which will 
attempt to bring new solutions of the old, perplexing problems of motivation, 
performance, and retention of airport checkpoint security personnel. 
The SME has a real understanding of these answers, and will provide them with 
consensus through a Delphi workshop. The Delphi process furnishes a means to 
measure security checkpoint screener job satisfaction and dissatisfaction to portray 
important implications towards retention and attrition problems current airport security 
companies are facing. The 1989 President's Commission report emphasized that 
security deficiencies were found in the investigation of the accident of Pan Am 103 in 
connections to breakdowns in airline security personnel performance. Simply stated the 
proficiency and effectiveness of retention and attrition within a security company may 
be achieved and evaluated by focusing upon employee job satisfaction, motivation, and 
dissatisfaction. The Delphi workshop identifies an ideal security checkpoint screener 
environment where employees will be motivated to produce at effective and substantial 
levels of security as they fulfill their needs of job satisfaction. 
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Subjects 
Subjects for this study were selected from the population of on-line Subject 
Matter Experts (SME's: airport checkpoint security screeners and supervisory staff) 
from three major airports in the United States. These were: (a) Orlando International 
Airport (MCO); (b) John F. Kennedy airport (JFK); and (c) San Francisco 
International airport (SFO). In all, 34 SME's participated, of which 14 were 
supervisors. The SME's were preselected by private security companies (i.e., 
Argenbright Security, and ITS) and the investigation team that headed the Delphi 
workshops. The SME's were individuals who were noted as: (a) being employees 
that were noted for being successful at their respective positions by their fellow workers 
and management; (b) perceived as potential contributors to the process; (c) 
demonstrating an ability to work in a team environment; (d) being expressive 
individuals that could communicate effectively in a group; (e) being employed for a 
minimum of 6 months as a screener within the past 4 years; and (f) a screener who 
completed the ATA curriculum and any prescribed security firm and/or State and 
Government training. The SME's have had initial training including both classroom 
and on-the-job training. Recurrent training and instruction have been given so that the 
SME's will maintain their knowledge and proficiency. Participants were also selected 
on the basis of having job longevity to be fully knowledgeable about the job at their 
particular cite. All participants received $150 compensation for their services. The 
SME's being hired to be in the workshop had been given the factual knowledge needed 
to participate, and they had been made aware of the most practical and efficient manner 
in which to use this knowledge. In addition, all work and consensus is based on SME 
experience and knowledge form being the expert in their job field. The procedural 
technique to select the sample and sample size was random depending on the 
geographic location of the airport, airport congestion, airport size, the number of 
working and available SME personnel, and cooperation with the FAA and security 
company. The three groups of SME's participating in the Delphi workshops consisted 
of 14 (MCO), 10 (JFK), and 10 (SFO) airport security checkpoint screeners. 
Instruments 
All Delphi workshops were conducted off-site from the security checkpoint 
areas. The typical environment for the workshops was an airline training room within 
the airport complex, but away from the security firm management and administrative 
offices. 
Delphi Workshop! 
An effective scheme should optimally obtain inputs from employees while 
minimizing distinctive differences. The Delphi technique (Linstone and Turoff, 1975) 
provides on such avenue to obtain these data. The Delphi technique also furnishes the 
advantage of generating data that can be converted into a survey format for large scale 
data collection endeavors at a later time. The Delphi technique is also very versatile, in 
that, the costs of putting one together is relatively low, with regard to the envisioned 
benefits. The Delphi techniques were originally developed by the Rand Corporation 
more than forty years ago for reaching consensus on complex problems (Linstone & 
Turoff, 1975). The methodology has enjoyed particularly strong use in forecasting and 
long-term planning among planners (Linstone & Turoff, 1975; Dalkey, 1967; Helmer, 
1967; Pike and North, 1969; Delbecq, 1975; Weaver, 1971). Delphi techniques have 
become common methodologies for eliciting analysis, expert opinions, and evaluations 
on a wide span variety of topics. In the following Delphi workshop a revised Delphi 
method was used to develop SME consensus (explained later). Delphi techniques may 
be characterized as a method for structuring group process so that the process is 
effective in allowing a group of individuals, as a whole, to deal with a complex « 
problem (Linstone and Turoff). 
During its initial development, the Delphi process used a series of 
questionnaires for eliciting analysis, subject matter expert opinions, and ratings. The 
Delphi is a set of procedures eliciting and refining the opinions of a group of people 
(i.e., SME's). The initial questionnaire typically solicited responses on a broad 
question. In this study, however, the Delphi Study will be modified. In most cases it 
is easier to talk about a subject than to write about it" (Delbecq, 1975, p. 107). Each 
subsequent questionnaire is increasingly more focused since it uses the data from the 
preceding questionnaire for refinement (Delbecq, 1975). Typically the process requires 
.three interactions for consensus to be reached (Dalkey, 1967). On the other hand, no 
standard number of iterations are necessary and the process is considered complete 
when the investigators have obtained the desired level of information. 
Throughout the history of the Delphi techniques, many methodological pitfalls 
have emerged (Linstone, 1975). Primary among these that are germane to this research 
project are: (a) ensuring against suppression of divergent views; 
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(b) oversimplification of concepts by participants; (c) ensuing a variability of facilities 
so as not to obtain a narrow window of expertise; (d) poor execution by inadequate 
selection of participants or providing little feedback and explanation of the process; and 
(e) guarding against deception about purpose of the process. Many of these 
methodological problems are partly caused by anonymous questionnaires where the 
investigators and participants are not in physical contact with one another. The 
standard Delphi technique thus provides no opportunity for group training or 
discussion; the data compiled, the next questionnaire developed, and so on for several 
iterations. A loss of participants from the initial population can be justified with each 
iteration from this procedure. 
The Delphi process has undergone many changes since it has been developed by 
the Rand Corporation (Sackman, 1974). The revised Delphi used in this study was a 
modified methodology technique which is interjected to further structure the group 
process. For example: (a) it brings the participants physically together; (b) it 
incorporates formal instruction to the participants in group processes and methods of 
consensus; (c) it provides and facilitate group exercise in group processes; (d) it 
utilizes anonymous individual written data as a basis for group deliberations; and (e) it 
uses group facilitators to guide group interaction and maintain focus toward the Delphi 
goals. The Delphi process will rely heavily on direct interaction between the 
facilitators and the SME's. This approach is selected primarily because of the 
objectives and the requirement to maintain a high level of focus for the group 
consensus. 
Unlike other evolutions of the Delphi technique, this methodology relies heavily 
on direct interaction between the facilitators and the participants. It requires an 
interactive approach to generate the data base. All participants are provided training 
before data development procedures are initiated. Participants are briefed on the 
purpose of the work shop, its goals and use of all data. Confidentiality of the 
individual data is assured during the briefing. Given the nature of the population of 
interest, additional training was provided thru a background briefing during the initial 
hours of the first day of the workshop. Included with this training are concepts in 
group dynamics, group think, bias, consensus development, leadership, and 
psychological traits and abilities, that familiarize the individuals of the roles and rules 
they are expected to follow to ensure a successful workshop. This technique was 
utilized primarily because of the complexity of the objectives and the requirement to 
maintain a high level of concentration for the group consensus. 
Design: 
Because of the complexity of the issues immersed and the limited time available 
to conduct the workshops, numerous materials were developed and distributed prior to 
beginning each Delphi. The process involved putting together a pre-Delphi workshop 
packet, that was to be given to each SME 3-4 days before the workshop commenced, 
and was to be used as a guide during the two day workshops procedures (see 
APPENDIX A). The pre-Delphi workshop packet materials essentially outlined the 
workshop schedule, briefly described the necessary group processes panorama, and 
defined the focal issues of the Delphi. In addition, the pre-Delphi workshop packet 
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was a description of the overall research project. A cover letter conveying appreciation 
for the SME participation ad detailing logistical information was also included (see 
APPENDIX B). The SME's were instructed to review these materials before the 
workshop began. 
The pre-workshop packets provided a starting point for each individual SME. 
The pre-workshop packets were color-coded to direct participants to each of the tasks 
described above (e.g., "First look over the PINK AGENDA to become familiar with* 
the workshop sequence."). Each of the tasks also indicated an estimated amount of 
time it would take to complete the individual task. All rating scales were simple five or 
seven point structured likert scales with textual anchor points (see APPENDIX A). 
Participants enjoyed the freedom to respond to the objectives with only broadly defined 
goals. The workshop objective are displayed in APPENDIX C. 
In order to establish a foundation for group work on the Delphi issues, the 
SME's were furnished item pools of factors that were related to the issues. This 
material was intended to facilitate and guide the inputs on the three major issues (of 
which the last two are utilized for this Thesis). The SME's were instructed to read the 
complete pre-workshop packet and individually identify and add or delete to the list to 
the provided {screenerpreselected list) of the reasons why people enjoy or stay on the 
job; individually identify and add or delete to the list provided Screener preselected 
list) of the reasons why people do not like the job or quit. After considering both lists, 
the SME's were to individually suggest what can be done to improve the job, make it 
more enjoyable and satisfying, or how the pay and reward system can be made better, 
and what is needed to be changed to help people stay on the job. This list of factors 
were to impact career retention and job satisfaction (see APPENDIX A). Most of the 
individual items were derived by comments from screeners and supervisors. It is 
important to note that no attempt was made to be comprehensive. The material was to 
facilitate discussion and reflection on the specific issue. 
There were two major reasons for offering initial data to the SME's. First, this 
procedure was to accomplish the objectives of the Delphi process within a rigorous • 
time period. Screeners and supervisors are operational personnel and their services are 
required to maintain adequate staffing at the security checkpoints. A lengthy research 
protocol would interfere with personnel scheduling. As noted before levels of turnover 
are abnormally high within airport security companies and utilizing a core group of 
personnel for a lengthy period of time would impact both the manpower and, thus, the 
overall security of the airport. This study, consequently, was a descriptive method 
that determined and derived the job satisfiers and motivators in terms of a reason why 
screeners try or want to stay on the job; and the job dissatisfiers in terms of reasons to 
dislike the job or quit. 
Procedures: 
Each Delphi workshop was conducted identically using a four-stage process. 
SME's were guided through: a) an introductory stage; b) group process training; c) 
preparatory stage; and d) Delphi process stage. The initial two stages were only given 
before the first issue was to begin to eliminate redundant training and overview 
information. The workshop had four facilitators present to make sure the SME's 
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stayed focused to the goals of the workshop. They provided an open comfortable 
atmosphere so that each participant could be of impact and equality in the consensus of 
each goal. 
In the introduction to the workshop there was a welcome and introduction of 
participants and staff. The participants were then briefed on the project overview. For 
example: the purpose, the goals and use of all data, sincere interest in the FAA, 
appreciation for their expertise, convey the facilitators role and the basic concepts ofe 
the Delphi workshop. Particular emphasis was placed on the importance of the data 
and the value of using the participants as subject matter experts. Confidentiality of the 
individual data was assured during the introduction briefing and throughout the 
workshop. It was made sure that everyone understood that they would only know their 
individual ratings and the group mean. Every effort was made to convey to the 
participants that they were the experts and only they, as a group, had the knowledge of 
the job satisfiers and dissatisfiers that were necessary to want to stay or leave the job. 
The facilitators further explained that the reasons and motivation to remain in the career 
field required close examination, and had thus far been an mystery to the research 
team. The Delphi process was presented and emphasized as a team effort, and that a 
cooperative and open interaction was necessary among and between participants and 
facilitators. 
During the introductory stage of the workshop, participants completed a pre-
workshop survey and a background/biographical form (see APPENDIX A). The pre-
workshop survey assessed initial attitudes and expectations about the workshop process, 
whereas the biographical data focused on related job experience factors (e.g., time at 
the current job, length of time with the company, position, and X-ray systems used). 
Both surveys had self-contained instructions. All returned forms were assigned a code 
and placed into a database by a single facilitator as the process continued by the other 
facilitators, thus conserving valued time. The codes were to ensure the SME's 
anonymity. The introductory stage concluded with the dispersement of administrative 
and logistical information (e.g., background forms, payment vouchers, and room . 
locations to be used in the airport during study). This initial stage ordinarily took 60 
minuets for completion. 
The group process stage was initiated after a short break period. Additional 
training was provided that familiarized the SME participants with the methods of group 
processes. Included with this training are concepts in group dynamics, the recognition 
and avoidance of group think phenomena, bias, consensus development, leadership, 
psychological traits and abilities. Group interaction techniques were the spotlight of 
this stage. All material was presented using a combination of lecture, class room type 
question and answer, media presentations, and demonstrations. 
The first objective (not utilized for this thesis) (i.e., personality items and 
abilities) was in actuality a practice and/or training exercise, since the scientific 
literature does not bear much weight on personality tests as accurate performance 
predictors. This training exercise was a pertinent foundation for the following issues to 
be presented. The next two objectives were viewed imperative to the airport 
checkpoint security screeners occupation. The objectives were a list of job satisfiers 
and motivators, and a list of reasons to dislike their job or quit (these lists are all job 
satisfiers, motivators, reasons to dislike or quit that were given from airport security 
checkpoint screeners) (refer to APPENDIX C). Participants were re-assured that the 
facilitators were not part of the group and would guide the process during group 
interaction. Considerable effort was directed to guarantee that all participants felt 
comfortable with the process. This stage of the process averaged about 60 minuets for 
completion. 
The preparatory stage began with a review of the objectives, goals, and 
individual responsibilities. The bulk of this stage, however, centered around 
presentation and clarification of the issues. The facilitators re-emphasized how the data 
is obtained and used. The SME's were informed that individual evaluations of the 
items are required for the next stage of the process. The SME's were briefed on the 
intangible framework of each technique. With the assistance of a facilitator, a selection 
of a scaling technique that is best suited for the follow-on evaluations were chosen. 
Scale values will be dependent on the technique selected. The data and the data's uses 
was reiterated to ensure that both small groups and the bringing together of the large 
jjroup completely for consensus completely understood the value of their contribution 
and to assist in providing a clear focus to the group process. Instructions for group 
work were clarified with particular attention devoted to the comprehension of the 
concepts underlying the likert scales that would be utilized in the judgement 
evaluations. The difference between judging items and ratings was repeated to review 
specific reference to the distributed item pools and likert scales. 
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Once the facilitators responded to all questions and concerns, the SME's were 
released to begin their small group work. The intact Delphi group was separated into 
two small groups, these two groups were isolated into two different rooms in their 
respective airports. Since adequate numbers of SME's were available at each site, two 
intact groups were assembled to function independently. The separation was devised to 
facilitate in-depth exploration of the objectives and forthcoming issues. Establishment 
of two independent databases provided a means to conduct split-half reliability analysis. 
Small groups had either five or seven members and were assigned from the larger intact 
group by the facilitators and station managers in order to avoid any personality 
conflicts, bias, and to keep friendship relationships or supervisor/screener relationships 
from keeping everyone in the group from being equal. The preparatory stage averaged 
30 minutes to complete. 
The final stage of the Delphi process re-convenes the group to develop 
consensus on the importance of individual items with each content area. This stage was 
the predominate component of the work group sessions. SME's were initially tasked to 
work in a small group setting, and were provided an item pool for each of the Delphi 
precincts that addressed the issues of job retention and attrition factors (concerning the 
areas which would make a screener want to stay on the job or leave the job). Several 
scaling options are presented to the group. The data then was accumulated and 
provided to the group as feedback and as basis for group discussion and consensus. 
The SME's were briefed that their individual data and their judgement ratings were 
collapsed and presented to the small work group anonymously to use in group 
discussion. Individual inputs are not identified within this feedback only their own 
initial evaluations and the group mean for each item. Participants were free to input 
new concepts, review, modify existing ideas, delete items, and prepare commentary for 
each item pool where they saw fit. There were no restrictions placed on extending the 
item pools. The initial factors were a compendium of initial factors that were 
developed from screener and supervisor comments. While reviewing and extending the 
qualitative content of the item pools, SME's were also asked to reach consensus as a-
small group and scale each of the items by evaluating them for importance. The 
SME's were addressed several fundamental areas before they were allowed to begin 
their work. These were: (a) SME's were ensured that the item pools were only an 
initial starting point, and that it was decisive for them to add or modify the items based 
on their own unique perceptions; (b) SME input and their comprehensiveness of the 
item pools was the most important facet of the workshop; (c) facilitators re-iterated 
that all individual data, both qualitative and quantitative, were combined and presented 
to the group as grouped data without individual identification; (d) the SME's were 
briefed that the small group consensus data would be the basis for further intact group 
work, and that it would be beneficial for them to maintain private notes to use during 
the intact group discussions; (e) the SME's were briefed on the job of the facilitator, 
including time management and their roles. 
The initial focus of the work groups was to extend the item pool through 
facilitated exploration of the issues. Individual input was encouraged to clarify and 
modify each item as necessary. The facilitators promoted group discussion by 
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challenging or provoking inquiry into the ratings provided for each item. Through this 
open process of iteration and structured reflection and thought, the item pool and 
individual item ratings were modified. This led to the development of an intact group 
consensus from the two smaller work groups. 
The SME's and facilitators reconvened to conduct the intact group process 
work. The initial input to the intact group process work was computer generated 
(Lotus 123) and evaluations compiled from both of the small groups. Once consensus 
was consummated within the individual small groups, all participants were reconvened 
into the larger intact group. This process generated the finalized item pool and 
evaluations for each Delphi. These data would later be collapsed across all Delphi's 
and be retained as the foundation for the survey. The survey would be utilized to 
extend the generalizations of the findings and allow a more diverse input to the 
research. Typically this process requires three to six hours for completion and is 
dependent on the complexity and size of the database. The process generates an 
extensive and exhaustive item pool. 
The Delphi workshops concluded with SME's completing two post-workshop 
surveys, then a question and answer debriefing was held to further gather any concerns 
the screeners had with the Delphi workshops. A group process survey of seven items, 
using a 5-point scale (see APPENDIX A), required participants to evaluate the group 
process with respect to goal clarity, group relationships, resource management, and 
decision-making processes. The second workshop assessment survey asked participants 
to evaluate workshop products (see APPENDIX A). SME's evaluated satisfaction with 
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the workshop, effectiveness of feedback, and personal contribution to the process. This 
helped provide feedback to the facilitators. 
Analysis 
The Delphi workshops had thirty-four screeners participate from two security 
companies (Argenbright, and ITS). Of those 34, 14 were supervisors (41%) and the 
other 59% were screeners. Twenty-one were female (62%) and 13 (38%) were male. 
The screeners "time at current job" ranged from 6-168 months (Mean = 34.9 months; 
and the standard deviation = 31.7 months) and "time with company" ranged from 11-
168 months (mean = 42.8 months; and the standard deviation = 34.2 months) (see 
APPENDIX D). 
All screeners (N = 34) were grouped into six categories by 12-month increments. 
This was done for simplistics of getting an overall rating of screeners on the job in one 
year increments. A histogram showing the number of months employed (i.e., time at 
current job) is shown in Figure 7. All screeners who participated in the delphi (as 
mentioned previously) have completed the ATA-approaved training course and were 
consisered to be a good-to-superior screener by their company. 
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Figure 7. Frequency Distribution of Participants by Number 
of Months Employed at Current Job. 
Pre-Workshop Survey 
This section consisted of six questions inquiring about screeners' opinions and 
attitudes toward the workshop and fellow co-workers. Screeners responded on a seven-
point scale with anchors varying from question to question. A figure is exhibited for 
each of the six questions that were asked to the screeners in the Pre-Workshop Survey. 
The figures illustrate the frequency of screener responses. APPENDIX E presents the 
data from the Pre-Workshop Survey in tabular format. 
Question 1 asked screeners to rate their job skills and understanding comparable 
to their fellow co-workers. Ratings ranged from (Very Highly Skilled = 1) to (No Skill 
= 7). The mode was 2 and the median was 2 which signified that the majority of the 
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screeners felt very skillful in understanding and evaluating the job as compared to their 
fellow workers. The frequency histogram of the seven possible ratings for this item is 
shown in Figure 8. 
1. As a pre-board x-ray screener (in this group of screeners), my skills in 
understanding and evaluating the job put me about here, relative to the 
others. 
Question 1 
50°/c 
10% l l l I I I 0% 
1 2 
Very Highly 
Skilled 
Measure of Central Tendency 
Mode = 2 
Median = 2 
3 4 5 
Skill Level 
7 
No Skill 
At All 
Figure 8. Frequency Distribution of Screeners* Responses to 
Pre-Workshop Question 1. 
Question 2 asked for a rating of how screeners felt their ideas would be 
accepted by their co-workers. Rating ranged from (Yes, absolutely = 7) to (No, not at 
all). The mode was 2 and median was 3 indicating that the majority of screeners were 
confident that their ideas were in agreement with fellow workers. The frequency 
histogram of the seven possible ratings for this item is shown in Figure 9. 
2. I think my ideas will be in agreement with the rest of the screeners 
in the group. 
Question 2 
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Figure 9. Frequency Distribution of Screeners' responses to 
Pre-Workshop Question 2. 
Question 3 asked for a rating of how well screeners knew their fellow co-
workers. Ratings ranged from (Yes, pretty much =1) to (No, none at all = 7). 
The mode was 1 and the median was 2 indicating that most of the screeners knew their 
fellow workers well. The frequency histogram of the seven possible ratings for this 
item is shown in Figure 10). 
3. I know most of the screeners very well. 
Figure 10. Frequency Distribution of Screeners' Responses to 
Pre-Workshop Question 3. 
Question 4 asked for a rating of screeners' knowledge of the necessary skills 
and abilities required for successful performance as a screener. Ratings ranged from 
(Yes, lots = 1) to (No none = 7). The mode was 2 and the median was 2 indicating 
that most of the screeners know what the required skills and abilities are for success as 
a screener. The frequency histogram of the seven posssible ratings for this item is 
shown in Figure 11. 
4. I have some definite ideas about what the necessary skills and abilities 
are for success as a screener. 
Question 4 
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Figure 11. Frequency Distribution of Screeners' Responses to 
Pre-Workshop Question 4. 
Question 5 asked for a rating of screeners' experience relative to others 
participating in the workshop. Ratings ranged from (Yes = 1) to (No = 7). The 
mode was 2 and the median was 2 indicating that there was a variety of experience 
levels present at the workshops. The frequency histogram of the seven possible ratings 
for this item is shown in Figure 12. 
5. I have been in airport screening longer than most of the other 
screeners here. 
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Measure of Central Tendency: 
Mode = 2 
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Firure 12. Frequency Distribution of Screeners' Responses to 
Pre-Workshop Question 5. 
Question 6 asked for a rating of the screeners' perceptions as to what the 
workshop will accomplish. Ratings ranged from (Yes, I think it will be = 1) to (No, I 
think it may be a waste of time = 7). The mode was 1 and the median 1 indicating 
that the majority of the screeners felt the workshop would be successful and worth 
while. The frequency histogram of the seven possible ratings for this item is shown in 
Figure 13. 
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6. I am anticipating that the workshop is going to be a good 
experience and will accomplish what we need to do. 
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Question 6 
3 4 5 
Anticipation No, I think it 
may be a waste 
of time 
Figure 13. Frequency Distribution of Screeners' responses to 
Pre-Workshop Question 6. 
Workshop Objectives 
This section of the survey was divided into three parts. The first part 
(personality items and abilities of successful screeners) is not included in this Thesis 
due to the fact that it does not reflect the attrition and rentenion problems that plague 
the aviation security industry today. The other two sections (job satisfiers and 
motivators, and reasons to dislike the job or quit) are included as beneficial facets to 
this Thesis. Several items were presented in this part of the workshop ( a total of 65 
items in all). The airport checkpoint security screeners rated each item by their level of 
perceived importance according to their respective 5-point scale. A table was generated 
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from these data for the two objectives portraying the intact group rating by site. It 
should be noted that in each of the following tables for the two objectives, the data was 
collected and then analyzed, and are presented in order of perceived importance. They 
are not in the order in which they were presented to the screeners during the 
workshops. 
The majority of the workshop was spent discussing these two objectives to reach 
a small group consensus and then ultimately an intact group consensus. To achieve this 
consensus particular attention was placed on the item meaning (i.e., how the group 
defined the word). This was essential in many cases before evaluating the individual 
items. In some instances, for example, item lists were modified to include new items 
not part of the original list, and, screeners might have merged other items or collapsed 
the item to systematically eliminate redundancies, whereas other items were deleted, 
indicated by an It, because of their obscurity, ambiguity, or irrelevance. 
Job Satisfiers and Motivators 
Job satisfiers and motivators asked each screener to rate each item in terms of "a 
reason why I try to/want to stay on the job." ratings ranged from (1 = Absolutely 
Unnecessary) to (5 = Absolutely Necessary). Those factors that appear to have a 
serious impact on career retention and attrition factors, and job satisfaction were rated a 
[5], whereas those rated a [1] or [2] were viewed as not nearly as important (see Table 
5). 
80 
Tabled. Job Satisfiers and Motivators - Intact Group Ratings by 
Level of Perceived Importance (N = 34). 
Job Satisfiers 
and 
Motivators 
• \ < % < . • " < 
1. Medical benefits 
2. Retirement benefits 
3. Appreciation "by** supervisors 
4. Importance of the work I do 
5. Desire to protect people 
6. Pride in my work 
7. Flexible hours and days 
8. The hours of the job (the shift work) 
9. Appriciation "of" supervisors 
10. Opportunities for rewards 
11. Enjoyment of helping people 
12. High responsibility of the lob 
13. Comfortable place to work 
14. Good general work experience 
15. Wages job pays 
16. Being around people 
17. Job is challenging 
18. Wanted to learn something new 
19. Like working with co-workers (companionship) 
20. Doing airport security work 
21. Enjoy being busy 
22. Thrill of finding targets 
23. Wanted to work in airports 
24. Recognition by company 
25. Fast pace of the job 
26. Want to stop terrorist acts 
27. Chance to move into supervisory positions 
28. Others think my iob is important 
29. Potential job contacts 
30. Makes a good second job 
31. Dislike other jobs that were available 
32. Difficulty of the job 
33. Doing a iob few others can do 
34. My family thinks the job is important 
35. Appreciation "from" manager 
36. Enjoy controlling people 
37. Job is easy 
38. To make friends 
39. Opportunity to find weapons 
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3.0 
* 
3.0 
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2.5 
1.5 
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3.0 
2.0 
3.0 
2.5 
2.0 
1.0 
1.5 
1.0 
2.0 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
JFK 
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Dissatisfiers and Dislikes 
Dissatisfiers and Dislikes asked screeners to rate each item that "best represents 
your feeling about why people quit and/or dislike being a screener." Ratings ranged 
from (1 = No effect what-so-ever) to (5 = Major reason). Many factors were rated 
either [4] or [5] indicating that this item is of "important" or a "major reason" for 
leaving the occupation (see Table 6). 
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lahieJi. Job Dissatisfiers and Dislikes - Intact Group Ratings by 
Level of Perceived Importance (N = 34). 
I! Job Dissatisfiers 
II and 
| | Dislikes 
1. Poor Pay 
2. Little or no medical benefits 
3. Found "better" iob 
4. Too much work for amount of pay 
p. No longer need second iob 
6. No retirement program 
[7. Doing job temporarily to earn extra money 
8. Criticism by supervisors 
9. Stressful 
10. No opportunities for advancement 
11. Not told upfront what to expect 
12. Supervisor problems 
13. Job is causing physical discomfort 
14. Afraid to make a mistake or be wrong 
15. Management not listening to suggestions and/or complaints 
16. Not apprreciated 
17. Passenger hostility 
18. Job was not what I thought it was 
19. Job is too difficult 
20. Having to work holidays 
21. I do not find job important 
[22. Hard to get to work 
23. Dislike co-workers 
24. Fear of finding weapons 
25. Work is tiring and exhausting 
26. Not being kept abreast of what's going on 
27. Working with passengers 
28. Family and/or spouse wants me to quit 
29. Confronting passengers 
30. Decisions have to made to fast 
31. Job is not challenging 
32. Dislike hours 
33. Do not like working weekends 
34. Job is boring 
35. Job is too fast paced 
36. Breaks/lunch time not enough 
37. Don't want to work in airports 
38. Not appreciated by company 
39. Criticism by supervisors 
r^"®^ '> , > * 
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1.5 
* 
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Intact 
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(n = 10) 
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4.0 
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4.0 
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Post-Workshop Survey 
This part of the survey was administered at the end of each Delphi workshop. It focused 
on group goals and was divided into two sections: a) process and b) products. The data 
is presented in tabular format (see APPENDIX F, process; APPENDIX G, products) and 
a figure is shown for each of the seven questions. The figures portray the frequency of the 
screeners' responses. 
Group Goals w Process 
The Group Goals -Process section embodied seven questions where screeners 
responded on a five-point scale with acnhors varying from question to question. Question 
1 asked the screeners to rate the clarity of their group's goals. Ratings ranged from (No 
apparent goals = 1) to (Goals very clear = 5). The mode was 4 and the median was 4 
indicating that the majority of screeners felt the group goals were very distinct. The 
frequency histogram of the five possible ratings for this item is shown in Figure 14. 
1. How clear are the group goals? 
Question 1 
50°/ 
g 40% 
£ 30% 
£ 20% 
1 10% 
0% 
1 
No apparent 
goals 
Measure of Central Tendency: 
Mode = 4 
Median = 4 
How Clear 
5 
Goals 
very clear 
Figure 14. Frequency Distribution of Screeners' to 
Post-Workshop "Process" Question 1. 
Question 2 asked screeners to rate how much trust and openness was in their 
group Ratings ranged from (Distrust = 1) to (Strong trust and openness = 5). The mode 
was 4 and the median was 4 indicating that their was much trust and openness in the 
groups. The frequency histogram of the five possible ratings for this item is shown in 
Figure 15. 
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2. How much trust and openness in the group? 
60% 
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Distrust 
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How Much 
Measure of Central Tendency: 
Mode = 4 
Median = 4 
5 
Strong trust 
and openness 
Figure 15. Frequency Distribution of Screeners' responses to 
Post-Workshop "Process" Question 2. 
Question 3 asked screeners to rate how sensitive and aware were the group 
members during the process Ratings ranged from (No awareness or listening in the group 
= 1) to (Outstanding sensitivity and awareness to others = 5) The mode was 4 and the 
median was 4 indicating that the sensitivity and awareness of the group members was 
slightly better than average The frequency of the five possible ratings for this item is 
shown in Figure 16 
3. How sensitive and aware are group members? 
50% 
g 40% 
u 
£ 30% 
•g 20% 
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Question 3 
0% 
No awareness 1 
or listening 
in the group 
Measure of Central Tendency: 
Mode = 4 
Median = 4 
2 3 4 
How Sensitive 
5 
Outstanding 
sensitivity 
to others 
Figure 16. Frequency Distribution of Screeners' Responses to 
Post-Workshop "Process" Question 3. 
Question 4 asked screeners to rate how group leadership needs were met Ratings 
ranged from (Not met, drifting =1) to (Everyone helped lead the group = 5). The mode 
was 5 and the median 5 indicating that the leadership functions were evenly distributed 
among group members The frequency histogram of the five possible ratings for this item 
is shown in Figure 17 
4. How were group leadership needs met? 
Question 4 
60% 
C 50% 
g 40% 
v 30% 
'J 20% 
& 10% 
1 
Not met, 
Drifting 
Measure of Central Tendency: 
Mode = 5 
Median = 5 
2 3 4 
Leadership needs Everyone helped lead the group 
Figure 17. Frequency Distribution of Screeners' Responces to 
Post-Workshop "Process" Question 4. 
Question 5 asked screeners to rate how group decisions were made. Ratings 
ranged from (No decisions could be reached = 1) to (Full participation and consensus = 
5) The mode was 4 and the median was 4 indicating that the groups made considerable 
attempts to look at all points of view and participate while coming to consensus The 
frequency histogram of the five possible ratings for this item is shown in Figure 18 
5. How were group decisions made? 
Question 5 
50% 
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Measure of Central Tendency: 
Mode = 4 
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Full participation 
and consensus 
Figure 18. Frequency Distribution of Screeners' Responses to 
Post-Workshop "Process" Question 5. 
Question 6 asked screeners to rate how well the group resources were used. 
Ratings ranged from (One or two contributed =1) to (Individual opinions were fully and 
effectively used = 5) The mode was 4 and the median was 4 indicating that the groups 
utilized all resources well and encouraged different opinions The frequency histogram of 
the five possible ratings for this item is shown in Figure 19 
6. How well were group resources used? 
Question 6 
80% 
One or two 
contributed 
Measure of Central Tendency: 
Mode = 4 
Median = 4 
3 4 
Group Resources Individual opinions were fully and 
effectively used 
Figure 19. Frequency Distribution of Screeners' Responses to 
Post-Workshop "Process" Question 6. 
Question 7 asked screeners to rate how much loyalty and sense of belonging there 
was in each group Ratings ranged from (Members had no group loyality or sense of 
belonging =1) to (Strong sense of belonging among members = 5) The mode was 5 and 
the median was 5 indicating that there was a strong sence of belonging in the groups The 
frequency histogram of the five possible ratings for this item is shown in Figure 20 
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7. How much loyalty and sense of belonging to the group? 
Question 7 
60% 
X 10° 
0% 
Members had no 1 
group loyality or 
sense of belonging 
Measure of Central Tendency 
Mode = 5 
Median = 5 
2 3 4 
Loyalty /Belonging Strong sense of belonging among 
members 
Figure 20. Frequency Distribution of Screeners' Responses to 
Post-Workshop "Process" Question 7. 
Group Goals - Products 
This section consisted of seven questions where screeners responded on a seven-
point scale with anchors varying from question to question (see APPENDIX E for 
Products' Questions Screener Responses). Question 1 asked screeners to rate their 
satisfaction with the workshop Ratings ranged from (I feel satisfied with the results = 1) 
to (I'm not really happy with the results at all = 7) The mode was 1 and the median was 2 
indicating that most of the screeners were exceptionally satisfied with the workshop 
results The frequency histogram of the seven possible ratings for this item is shown in 
Figure 21. 
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Products Question 1 
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I feel satisfied 
with the results 
Measure of Central Tendency: 
Mode= 1 
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I'm not really 
happy with the 
results at all 
Figure 21. Frequency Distribution of Screeners' Responses to 
Post-Workshop "Products" Question 1. 
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Question 2 asked screeners to rate their opinion about lessons learned from the 
various feedback. Ratings ranged from (I learned ideas from the feedback = 1) to (I didn't 
learn a thing from the feedback = 7). The mode was 1 and the median 1 indicating that the 
majority of the screeners learned various ideas from the feedback. The frequency 
histogram of the seven possible ratings for this item is shown in Figure 22 
Products Question 2 
60% 
I I I I 
1 2 
I learned ideas 
from the feedback 
Measure of Central Tendency 
Mode= 1 
Median = 1 
" •' ' ' " • 335555W! 533 H - . • - — . . . - • 
7 
I did not learn 
thing from the 
feedback 
Figure 22. Frequency Distribution of Screeners' Responses to 
Post-Workshop "Products" Question 2. 
Question 3 asked screeners to rate whether or not each screener agreed with the 
ideas in the feedback Ratings ranged from (I agree with the ideas in the feedback = 1) to 
(I disafreed with everything in the feedback = 7) The mode was 1 and the median was 2 
indicating that the majority of the screeners agreed with the ideas in the feedback The 
frequency histogram of the seven possible ratings for this item is shown in Figure 23. 
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Agreement I disagreed with everything in the 
feedback 
Figure 23. Frequency Distribution of Screeners' Responses to 
Post-Workshop "Products" Question 3. 
Question 4 asked screeners to rate their opinion on how easy it was to express 
their ideas Ratings ranged from (I could express my ideas OK this way = 1) to (I could 
not really say what I wanted to say = 7). The mode was 1 and the median was 1 
indicating that most of the screeners had little difficulty expressing their ideas and 
opinions The frequency histogram of the seven possible ratings for this item is shown in 
Figure 24. 
Products Question 4 
60% 
& 10% I I II I 0% 
I could express [ J, 
my ideas ok 
this way 
Measure of Central Tendency 
Mode= 1 
Median = 1 
3 4 5 
Express I could not really say what I 
wanted to say 
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Figure 24. Frequency Distribution of Screeners' Responses to 
Post-Workshop "Products" Question 4. 
Question 5 asked screeners to rate their willingness to speak during the workshop 
Ratings ranged from (I feel as if I really wanted to talk to people = 1) to (I did not feel the 
need to talk at all = 7). The mode was 1 and the median was 1 indicating that most of the 
screeners had no problems discussing their thoughts The frequency histogram of the 
seven possible ratings for this item is shown in Figure 25 
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Figure 25. Frequency Distribution of Screeners' Responses to 
Post-Workshop "Products" Question 5. 
Question 6 asked screeners to rate their opinion on how well the group understood 
their viewpoint Ratings ranged from (I have a feeling people did not understand or think 
about my reasons = 1) to (I think people understood my reasons pretty well = 7) The 
mode was 6 and the median 6 indicating that many of the screeners felt comfortable with 
how well the group understood their viewpoint The frequency histogram of the seven 
possible ratings for this item is shown in Figure 26 
Figure26. Frequency Distribution of Screeners' Responses to 
Post-Workshop "Products" Question 6. 
Question 7 asked screeners to rate the speed at which ideas and topics were 
discussed. Ratings ranged from (I think it went to quickly = 1) to (I think it went to 
slowly = 7). The mode was 2 and the median was 2 indicating that the majority of the 
screeners felt the workshop went fairly quick The frequency histogram of the seven 
possible ratings for this item is shown in Figure 27. 
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Figure 27. Frequency Distribution of Screeners' Responses to 
Post-Workshop "Products" Question 7. 
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Conclusions and Recommendations 
General Findings 
The most striking general observation that can be seen in the data is the relatively 
similar findings found across all three facilities. This finding is important in that all three 
facilities are widely different in the cultural and ethnic backgrounds of the workforce, and 
the facilities are geographically dispersed. Additionally, the facilities are operated by 
different security firms with different policies and procedures. These findings are 
encouraging as they indicate the sources of job satisfaction and dissatisfaction are related 
specifically to the nature of the job vice being attributed to the demographic biases within 
the workforce (i.e., relative time it takes airport security checkpoint screeners at JFK to 
get to work versus airport security checkpoint screeners at MCO or SFO). 
From an organizational viewpoint, the data supports the development of 
interventions that can be applied industry-wide. Interventions that are directed toward 
improving job satisfaction while mitigating or eliminating the causes of job dissatisfaction 
would be expected to enjoy similar degrees of success regardless of the facility. This 
significantly simplifies the development of intervention programs because it avoids the 
requirement of tailoring the programs to be site specific. If the site can adjust to the needs 
of the screener there probably will be a screener who is satisfied with the job and 
committed to the job. Such an approach aids the evaluation process of the effectiveness of 
the implemented programs, as well, by allowing a comparison of performance of facilities 
(i.e., turnover rates, job satisfaction, inventories) both with and without intervention 
programs applied. A comparison of the individual effectiveness of intervention techniques 
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can also be achieved by differentially applying the techniques among facilities. Perhaps the 
government stepping in to lead this approach would intermittently aid all contractors and 
all airlines equally. 
The Delphi workshop facilitators remarked about the level of enthusiasm and 
enjoyment expressed by the participants. There was a feeling shared among the facilitators 
that the workshop was a great success and how the workshop had a uniform flow. The 
author was amazed of the amount of information that was shared, expressed, and cameto 
successful consensus. The determination of the screeners to come to a clear consensus on 
each issue and the sincerity of the screeners to better their job environment were distinct 
features that were present during the workshop. 
It was also interesting to note that although there were 34 airport security 
checkpoint screeners each having their own different personalities, input was optimally 
shared from all participants while equally minimizing distinctive differences. The success 
was eminent by the clarity of the interaction between the facilitators and the participants 
(the quality of the data is contingent upon how effective the group members inter-relate). 
It is for this reason that post-workshop surveys that assess both process and product 
dimensions were conducted. The pre-workshop survey was also conducted as a means to 
view what preconceived expectations the participants had, and to give them a feel for what 
was to come. Furthermore, it was also obvious that the training at the beginning of the 
workshop on the concepts of group dynamics, group think, bias, consensus development, 
leadership, and psychological traits and abilities, that familiarized the individuals of the 
roles and rules that they were expected to follow was an excellent guide to aid in the 
requirement to maintain a high level of concentration for the group consensus. 
The degree of appreciation demonstrated by the screener participants at the 
conclusion of all workshops was sincere and explicitly indicated the success of the 
workshop process. Post workshop data presented in Figure 21 (page 91) and personnel 
letters of feed back written to the author (see Text Box 1) convincingly support these 
observations. 
Text Box 1, Follow up Letter from Mrs. Ferrell (SME, JFK) 
"Mr. Mark St. Laurent 
Let me start by thanking you and your staff once 
again, for that two day session. It really felt good to 
have someone listen to our grief, being able to speak 
honestly and openly was a great release...Thanks for you 
and your staffs consideration. I hope that your input 
can change some of these things" 
Mrs. Ferrell 
The Delphi process was conducted, in part, for the purpose of identifying and 
evaluating the factors that lead to an employee leaving his/her job. In this regard, the 
process was productive in identifying issues that interventions could be directed toward. 
The Delphi process was not used, nor would it have been appropriate to use, as a means 
to develop solutions to problems. A word of caution is also advised in reviewing the data. 
The factors that were identified may not be individually responsible as a reason for leaving 
employment, but must be acknowledged as a set of satisfiers and dissatisfiers with relative 
valences. A decision to quit a job is a complex one that may include any number of 
consideration factors. The intact group consensus values are also just that, they are a 
product of group consensus and are an agreement among participants. An individual's 
personal decision may weigh these factors differently depending on their own 
circumstances and other available options. 
Post-Workshop Survey - Process 
The process survey indicated that participants had positive perceptions regarding 
all aspects of the Delphi process including goal clarity, group openness and sensitivity, 
group decision making and shared leadership, and group loyalty. Process evaluations 
were consistently toward the extreme positive range of the scale with little variance 
between facilities or within groups. Six of the seven process ratings exceeded 4.0 on the 
5-point scale with the variance never exceeding 25 percent of the mean after the data was 
collapsed across all three facilities. An additional finding of interest is the consistent trend 
toward more positive evaluations across the three facilities when viewed in chronological 
order in which they were conducted. This probably reflects the increasing level of 
experience of the facilitators. As the facilitators become more comfortable with their roles 
and refine their skills, facilitation of the group process was more effective. 
Post-Workshop Survey - Products 
The post-workshop survey regarding workshop products was also very 
encouraging. Of the seven factors evaluated, five were rated toward the extreme positive 
anchor of the 7-point scale. Participants were very positive about the results, feedback, 
capability to express ideas, and the willingness to communicate during the workshop. 
Although rated moderately positive, participants were comparatively less positive 
regarding their perception of how well other screeners understood their ideas. This in 
effect could have been a factor of the amount of time there was to discuss each individual 
topic with additional examples. Again, it is important to note, that there was a trend 
toward more positive ratings across facilities when view in chronological order. Most 
notable is with regard to the pace that the workshop proceeded. The initial workshop was 
perceived as moving too quickly, but with the second and third Delphi workshops the 
ratings for the pace of the process progressively were rated close to the ideal. 
Thesis Objectives in Workshop 
Two issues need to be addressed before examining the data. First, participants 
evaluated these factors with regard to their importance for the future, future expectations, 
and outlook of their jobs. At the time this work was conducted, medical and retirement 
benefits were usually nonexistent or only minimally provided for by the union (e.g., 
medical benefits for JFK screeners). Wages as a standard were at minimum wage or 
within 25 percent of the federal minimum for screeners and only slightly higher for 
supervisor personnel. Cash rewards for identifying FAA targets or actual targets were 
only of a token nature ($25 to $50) and were infrequent. Two screeners at two separate 
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sites noted that they were promised cash rewards for their detection of a target, and to this 
day have never been rewarded. Many of the screeners admitted to never have seen a 
reward given to a screener for a successful detection. However, many airport checkpoint 
screeners outspokenly admitted that the airlines and the security companies were quick to 
administer negative penalties to fellow workers for missing a target. The literature 
strongly suggests that negative reinforcement of this nature is a good way to increase 
unwanted employee turnover. On rare occasions, small gratuities were received from 
passengers for an extra service provided (e.g., transporting a handicapped passenger from 
one concourse to another or helping an elderly woman with here luggage across the 
airport). Participants therefore evaluated these issues as the way they would like to see 
them rather than as they currently exist. 
The second major issue that needs to be addressed before examining the data is the 
relationship of these factors to one another. The job satisfiers and the job dissatisfiers 
both had a unidimensional effect towards the participants. Medical and retirement benefits 
were considered more crucial than wages and the opportunity for rewards as motivators to 
remain on the job. This is probably do to the considerable increase in public attention 
given to both health care and the status of the social security system (i.e., retirement), or 
do to the fact that the majority of the screeners were aware of the high cost of medical 
treatment and have families to support. Regardless of the source of concern, the airport 
security checkpoint screeners valued medical and retirement benefits more than monetary 
compensation. This is not easily differentiated from the data due to the limitations of the 
scale values used. 
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This discussion was provided to heighten the awareness of the reader to the issues 
beyond compensation. It is important to keep in mind Herzbergs' views (and other 
researchers) on the categories of motivators that accomplish satisfaction and 
dissatisfaction when reviewing the data. This will ultimately help put ideas and findings 
into perspective. The hygiene needs which prevent dissatisfaction and the feelings of 
achievement, recognition for accomplishment, challenging work, increased responsibility, 
and growth and development that produce job satisfaction. A comparison and contrast of 
Hertzberg's motivators along with the Delphi workshop conclusions give a good 
prospective of research methods that have been studied throughout the past few decades 
and relate them to the current findings on satisfiers and dissatisfiers found among airport 
security checkpoint personnel. 
Satisfaction and Motivation 
The proficiency and effectiveness of retention and attrition factors can be achieved 
and evaluated by focusing upon employee job satisfaction and job dissatisfaction. Data 
generated by the Delhi workshops for purposes of this Thesis focused on the issues: (a) 
job satisfiers and motivators; and (b) reasons to dislike job or quit. Literature strongly 
suggests that there are parallel relationships between job satisfiers and dislikes that impact 
a security checkpoint screeners decisions to stay on, or leave the job. Interesting findings 
from this study on job satisfiers and motivators that are noteworthy and contribute to 
career retention for airport security checkpoint screeners can be classified into several 
categories: (a) compensation/benefits; (b) social/intrinsic; (c) job convenience factors; 
and (d) recognition. Unlike Herzberg, all the factors involved in producing job satisfaction 
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were not separate and distinct from all the factors that prompted job dissatisfaction. In 
fact, many of the issues that came to consensus were contributors to both job satisfaction 
and job dissatisfaction. Within each of the four categories of motivators, several factors 
were consistently rated as absolutely necessary or job dissatisfaction would increase and 
job satisfaction would decrease. Not surprisingly, medical benefits, retirement benefits, 
and wages were all evaluated as major compensation/benefit contributors (related to 
Herzberg's hygiene factors) that contributed to both job satisfaction and job 
dissatisfaction. The opportunity for rewards (e.g., FAA and authentic targets), 
achievement and recognition were consistent motivational factors in producing job 
satisfaction. It is important to note Lawler and Jenkins (1992) in that the kind and level of 
rewards an organization offers influence who is attracted to work for an organization and 
more importantly who will continue to work for it. These factors received among the 
highest evaluations of the 32 factors identified as contributing to job satisfaction (see 
APPENDIX D). 
Social and intrinsic motivators and satisfiers were also found to contribute 
considerably to the checkpoint screener remaining on the job. Like Hertzberg's theory, it 
was also found that the nature and purpose of the airport checkpoint screener jobs offered 
strong determinants of job satisfaction. Most importantly, airport checkpoint security 
personnel found considerable gratification in the importance of their work, were very 
proud of the work they perform, and had a true desire to protect people. To the 
participants, these motivators were nearly as important to job satisfaction as compensation 
and benefits, thus, providing the information that can lead to better satisfaction and 
fulfillment on the job. The participants in the Delphi workshops noted that if the security 
companies matched these needs with the job itself the outcome would be a security 
screener who is satisfied with the job and committed to the job. As a result the airport 
security checkpoint personnel will call in sick less, be less likely to leave the job, and will 
produce higher quality work (i.e., better detection rates). These goals all add up. For the 
security screener it means a satisfied work environment and for the company (both the 
security company and the airline) it means higher profits. If a security screeners needs are 
not satisfied by the job itself, they will end up frustrated (as clearly noted by the delphi 
workshop and seen by the high turnover rates) and either will quit or do poor work. Poor 
work directly relates to the significance of the role each airport security checkpoint 
screener has in controlling the increasing problem of aviation terrorism and providing the 
needed level of safety for each passenger. 
To a lesser degree, it was found that the participants derived considerable job 
satisfaction in helping people (i.e., passengers), wanting to learn a new skill, and in the 
perceived high level of responsibility that came naturally with the job. Equally important 
was the social environment provided by their work atmosphere. The participants enjoyed 
their work because it allowed them to be around people, and offered them companionship 
through their co-workers. This was noted especially true for the older screener age group 
The job environment offered them companionship and an environment that might be hard 
to find elsewhere. It was the participant's perception that the job offered older screeners 
"a good way to pass time with friends". These factors grouped together were important 
considerations in the decision to remain on the job. Along the same line, friendliness 
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appears to be one of the distinguishing characteristics of a good work environment for the 
participants. A relaxed attitude and relative lack of a social hierarchy between 
management and screeners would be more effective in this situation. Given the lack of 
compensation and benefits provided, these factors were crucial in comparing their current 
jobs to other available opportunities. 
Many participants felt that management did not share an atmosphere of mutual 
respect. This has a negative effect on how everyday work conflicts (which are inevitable 
in every work environment) are handled. Participants noted social aspect that affected job 
satisfaction. Specifically noted was the fact that management was not fair to the 
employees and took advantage of them. One example given from a screener was a time 
when she was asked to work longer because of a shortage of employees due to snow. She 
agreed to help out. However, the public transportation she depended on to get home had 
been delayed do to the weather. At the end of the night after her extra hours she could 
not get home. The company had a van at the airport that gave management rides home in 
situations like this. However, the company would not take her home. Listening to the 
examples during the workshop made it clear that many unfair situations like this occur on 
a day to day basis for these employees. 
Most participants agreed that changing the social environment to one that limited 
contact with people would cause them to become dissatisfied and be a reason to want to 
leave. A number of examples of isolated work situations in airport security were provided 
by participants, and these positions were considered as the least desirable roles in the 
company. 
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Job convenience factors, work experience, and the airport environment also played 
a significant role in remaining on the job. Participants evaluated the flexibility of the work 
schedule as a primary reason to continue airport security work. The ability to change 
work days or schedule work hours, even on short notice, was a key element in remaining 
on the job. It became readily apparent that changes to this freedom of flexibility, or 
procedures to limit or restrict the ease of changing scheduled work hours (i.e., for 
management to obtain a more reliable and predictable workforce), would have a 
detrimental effect on retention. The jobs of an airport checkpoint security screener and 
supervisor were also perceived by participants as good work experience and could lead to 
potentially better opportunities. The high responsibility of the job and perspective job 
contacts at the airport played a major role in this outcome. In addition, the airport 
environment was considered a comfortable place to work and was also evaluated as a 
source of job satisfaction. 
The final general category of job satisfaction (i.e., recognition), was an area of 
considerable discussion in each of the three workshops. Lack of appreciation and 
recognition for the roles they play was a primary concern for the workshop participants. 
In an earlier FAA study conducted by L.A. Witt and C. Hellman (1992), they noted 
Eisenberger, Huntington, Hutchison, and Sowa (1986) for their suggestion that employees 
are more inclined to commitment and satisfaction when they feel that their organization 
values their input and cares about their well being. The study also noted that employees 
form global beliefs concerning the extent to which the organization is supportive of them 
and that perceived organizational support is related to increased commitment and 
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innovation and reduced absenteeism. One screener remarked, "...no ones character is 
taken into consideration. You are spoken to in a degrading manner. Your word has no 
bearing. There is no right when the employees are concerned". One example (of many) 
that a screener gave of a situation where a lack of respect is given towards her and her 
employees is shown in Text Box 2. 
Text Box 2. Example Given of Lack of Respect. 
"Example: The Director's Wife came through the 
screening checkpoint area 'which was very busy at the 
time1; there was only one hand scanner. The CSS asked 
if she minded if she was hand searched? She replied 
'Yes I mind1. So following regulations she was 
informed that she would have to wait and be searched 
before she could enter the sterile area. The search 
was conducted and she went on her way. A while later 
the CSS was called to the office and told that there 
was a complaint made that she touched the Director's 
wife's breast. The allegations were denied and the CSS 
told what had happened at the checkpoint. Management 
replied that they new she did not do it, however, 
because it was the Director's wife something needed to 
be done. The action taken: the supervisor was 
suspended for two days with out pay"-
Comparatively, recognition was almost as important as compensation and benefits 
and was a greater contributor to job satisfaction than the social or intrinsic rewards 
associated with the job. However, the recognition factors were rated as job conditions 
they would like to have, rather than job features as they currently have. Few participants 
perceived they were receiving adequate recognition for their performance; and as the data 
indicate, recognition by supervisors, managers, and the security firm were valued highly as 
a source of job satisfaction. Recognition by passengers was considered a potential source 
of job satisfaction, however; screeners acknowledged that this was not expected of 
passengers, nor could any intervention change this job element. 
Vine (1982), however, in his article "Airport Security tips (for those new to the 
screening game)" points out some interesting facts that can reduce the frustration of the 
passenger and ultimate improve the relationship between passenger and screener. One 
example give was to utilize guide rails or ropes and stanchions that direct first time 
passengers and experienced air-travelers who may not be familiar with a specific airport 
layout. These devices narrow groups into single file lines and eliminate the need to shout 
directions. Vine also indicates that the use of signs at the exiting end help reduce 
congestion and eliminate repeated questions. If everyone is allowed down the concourse, 
it is estimated that the number of people screened will be three times the number of 
passengers. If there are no concessions on the concourse, passengers will return to the 
terminal and increase the screening workload by 50 percent. This causes a delay and can 
cause frustration for both the costumer (passenger) and the employee (screener). 
On the occasions where passengers did express their appreciation, participants did 
feel it added to their enjoyment of the job, even if only temporarily. Interactions with 
passengers was more likely to contribute to job satisfaction. It is apparent from the data 
and some of the issues presented here that there are considerable number of job satisfiers 
and factors that contribute to a screener's decision to remain on the job. 
I l l 
Dissatisfiers and Dislikes 
The reader is referred to Table 6 (page 82) for a complete description and 
evaluation of Dissatisfiers that were derived through the Delphi process. The following 
discussion will provide clarification to those factors that contribute significantly to the 
turnover problem, and to provide some additional illustration for the factors. 
The major reasons to quit airport security work were clearly focused on monetary 
issues. Poor pay, little or no medical benefits, absence of a retirement program, and a 
perception that the amount of work required was considerably in excess of that 
appropriate for minimum wage, were all strong sources of job dissatisfaction. However, 
the data from this section was hard to group because there was a less concordance 
between facilities than that observed with the satisfaction and motivation objective. 
Additionally, it was observed that it was not uncommon for individuals to accept 
employment on a temporary basis (i.e., for a second income and a college student between 
semesters) and then terminate their employment when their needs were met. The Delphi 
workshops clearly identified that "pre-planned" limited employment was a major cause of 
turnover. Given the extensive array of negative elements of airport security work, and the 
comparatively poor compensation package, most screeners could be considered as actively 
involved in the job market. Most personnel are searching for opportunities that provide 
better benefits. Found a better job was evaluated as one of the primary reasons for the 
high turnover problem. 
Several other factors that were considered important sources of job dissatisfaction 
or reasons to terminate employment voluntarily can be described as management problems 
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and management practices. Problems with supervisors (e.g., public and improper 
disciplinary techniques), supervision criticism (i.e., imbalance between disciplinary and 
recognition/positive interactions), lack of appreciation, management not responsive to 
complaints or suggestions (i.e., little or no input sought from screeners and supervisors on 
technical or procedural matters), and little opportunity for advancement with the 
organization were strong contributors to job dissatisfaction. Considerable discussion and 
screener input throughout the Delphi workshops attributed much cause for turnover and 
job dissatisfaction to management practices. There was a predominant attitude that 
compensation and benefit issues were also directly related to management. The 
overwhelming "(mis) perception" that exists portrays the security firms as highly profitable 
companies that generate revenues by underpaying employees. It was apparent that 
screeners and supervisors have little or no understanding of the organization's structure or 
the contractual relationships (including the underbidding process of winning a contract) 
that exist between airline carriers and their company. 
Intervention can achieve desirable effects on these two additional yet significant 
factors that contribute to job dissatisfaction. First, company policies and consequences for 
"making a mistake or being wrong" (e.g., missing an FAA test object, passenger/aircrew 
complaint) were perceived as harsh and punitive. The concern that led to this factor being 
evaluated as an important job dissatisfier was not the consequences of making a mistake 
but rather it was related to the lack of recognition for outstanding performance. All 
participants were deeply concerned and dissatisfied that good performance was never 
rewarded, or only minimally rewarded (e.g., $25 bonus for FAA target detection). If a 
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reward was given it was to a select few that were friends with management. The politics 
involved were noted as being very discriminatory and unfair. To be motivated to perform 
well, an individual must first of all value the rewards offered. Defining appropriate 
rewards for good performance is an issue that management needs to deal with. Defining 
appropriate rewards becomes easier when management can compare their similar needs 
with that of the airport security checkpoint screener. Perhaps the best way to determine 
what rewards are important to a screener would be simply just to ask them. 
Ramifications for an error were exceedingly severe (i.e., suspension, termination, 
re-training). The ratio of rewards to punishments, and the relationship of 
acknowledgments to admonishment were the focus of many discussions. The second issue 
that was rated as a key element of job dissatisfaction and can be company controlled is a 
complaint of "not being told up-front what to expect." The workshop participants felt 
company procedures during the interviewing/hiring process need to be improved to more 
accurately portray the job and duties. Participants felt many new hires quickly terminated 
their employment because they were not aware of pertinent job requirements until actually 
physically working the checkpoint. A clear understanding that must exist between 
management and individual screener of job demands and expectations so that role 
perceptions are completely clarified. Continuous feedback is necessary between 
supervisors/management and the screener in an open, trusting, and truthful manner so that 
expectations on both sides can remain clear and even be changed if necessary. Feedback is 
a necessary, but not sufficient, condition of success. 
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Other important factors that lead to job dissatisfaction, but are less easily mitigated 
as they are elements inherent in the work include: stressful conditions, physical discomfort 
caused by lifting and remaining in a standing position throughout the shift, physical 
discomfort to the employees eyes, and passenger hostility. These factors in and of 
themselves are not likely to cause self-termination, although they do contribute to job 
dissatisfaction. 
A work environment that meets an organization's objectives and satisfies the job-
related needs of the security screener has much influence on the productivity and stability 
of the group. A positive, long-lasting, productive, work environment focuses around the 
image and impression that the screeners have about the dynamics of the security firm. A 
high degree of clarity must exist so that each individual screener knows exactly what 
his/her job entails and how his/her assignment contributes to the success of the screening 
team. Recognition is needed for a screener when he/she does good work. Good work 
should be rewarded more often than bad performance is criticized. Lastly, teamwork 
involves a feeling of belonging to an organization completely. The screeners at the 
checkpoint should be characterized ultimately by cohesion, commitment, mutual warmth, 
support, trust, and pride. 
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Initial Recommendations to Improve Employee Job Satisfaction, Decrease Employee 
Job Dissatisfaction and Increase Career Longevity 
The findings from the Delphi workgroups indicate that several 
interventions can be considered to improve employee tenure while consequently increasing 
the experience base of the workforce. Several suggested measures require extensive work 
in the development of training seminars and are more appropriately suited for a separate 
publication. The recommendations are as follows: 
1. Increase the starting wages of screener personnel to be competitive with 
current market conditions in order to attract more qualified applicants. 
Below market wages create a workforce that is continually involved in job-
seeking activities. 
2. Improve salary advancement schedules to compensate screener personnel 
for increased experience and tenure on position. This measure is intended 
to retain personnel who perform effectively. Wage increases should be of 
small magnitude, but on frequent intervals. Frozen salary schedules 
promotes increased job seeking activities. 
3. Consider company contributions to health coverage benefits in order to 
curtail the job seeking activities of quality personnel. A significant number 
of workshop participants were actively exploring the employment market 
primarily to acquire health coverage. Company contributions are 
suggested to increase with tenure to retain desirable employees. Gradual 
increases in company contributions that reduce the employee's share of 
medical coverage can be promoted as wage increases that do not increase 
the employee's taxable income. Current IRS laws also permit employees to 
set aside non-taxable income for use in covering medical expenses. An 
initial step in providing health coverage might be to establish such an 
individual fund on a voluntary basis. 
4. Improve staffing levels at security checkpoints to mitigate high workload 
levels during peak passenger traffic periods. This can be accomplished 
indirectly by improving employee tenure. Employee staffing levels become 
problematic since the number of personnel on any given day are uncertain 
due to high turnover rates. High turnover rates characteristically create an 
unstable workforce with high proportions of inexperienced PBS personnel. 
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Experienced personnel are further diluted to provide training on tinuous 
basis because of the constant influx of new hires. 
5. Consider the possibility of an employee contribution retirement program 
with a graduated scale of company contributions that is dependent on 
length of employee tenure. Eligibility can be established after six months 
with a low company contributions that is determined by length of tenure. 
Several options are currently available through financial and brokerage 
institutions that have little or no administrative cost to the participating 
employer. The benefit can be offered on a voluntary participation basis. 
Regardless, the facilitators found the preliminary findings indicated 
retirement benefits are an issue of high importance. 
6. Provide internal supervisory skills training and recurrent 
leadership/organization skills training to checkpoint supervisors. 
Considerable job dissatisfaction due to supervisor-screener relationships 
was identified in the Delphi workshops, as checkpoint supervisors had no 
opportunity to learn appropriate techniques. Although CSS personnel 
were technically competent and experienced with security operations, most 
were not provided with formalized and recurrent training in supervisory 
skills. Role modeling and management exercises are necessary components 
of this process. The U.S. military offers an excellent model of this type of 
training. 
Offering basic and advanced training in these skill areas further improves 
the value of the employee to the company while concurrently increasing the 
marketability of the individual for positions external to the company. It is 
anticipated that many supervisors would increase their company tenure if 
they improved their management skills and experience base as an avenue to 
broaden their opportunities outside the company. The company would 
therefore be providing no-cost training to employees in return for greater 
tenure, with the expectation of the individual eventually leaving the firm to 
advance their careers. The opportunity for professional growth would be 
perceived as an employee benefit while the company would enjoy the 
services of higher quality personnel during their employment. An indirect 
company benefit would be greater responsibility for CSS personnel to 
handle conflict resolution. 
It should also be pointed out that "no opportunity for advancement" was a 
major factor of perceived importance in contributing to self-termination. 
Advancement within security companies is limited, and expansion of 
external opportunities is warranted. Training and education in related areas 
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English as a second language) can also be offered internally as a benefit to 
both employee and the company. 
"Not told up front what to expect" was another major issue of job 
dissatisfaction. Briefly, extensive discussion focused on the lack of 
information provided about job requirements during the application/hiring 
process. General consensus among participants identified lack of 
understanding among personnel officers and interviewers as the basis for 
this problem. 
It is strongly recommended that company personnel responsible for the 
recruitment,hiring, interviewing, and processing of applicants undergo the 
ATA training curriculum to the level of certification. The selection process 
can be significantly improved by offering applicants expanded information 
about job demands, expectations, and requirements. This intervention will 
permit the opportunity for applicants to de-select themselves from further 
consideration before considerable company training resources are invested. 
Provide basic training and demonstration to all employees in job related 
areas (i.e., lifting heavy/bulk articles, human inter-personal 
communications) to reduce job-related stress and physical discomfort. 
Much of the job-related stress evolves from passenger and aircrew 
interactions. Clearly a seminar-formatted training program with periodic 
recurrent training is required in group dynamics, patterns of 
communications, conflict resolutions, and similar areas. Additional training 
in these areas benefits the company in reduced aircrew/passenger 
complaints, improved employee-employee relationships, and passenger 
compliance. Consequently, improving the marketability of the employee 
for external opportunities. 
Several areas and issues centered on management communications and 
responsiveness. The research team noted that screener and CSS personnel 
held widespread misperceptions and attitudes toward management that 
were not based in fact. As an example, misperceptions ranged from benefit 
issues (i.e., calculations of annual vacation/leave time) to promotion issues 
(i.e., profit margins of security firms). Much of these widespread 
misperceptions were based on a lack available accurate information and the 
development of alternate explanations by employees. 
Management interface and accessibility to all subordinate company 
employees is a readily apparent intervention. We suggest at least a periodic 
physical presence of management personnel at the checkpoints to gain first 
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hand awareness of potential problems and to observe screener/CSS 
performance directly. 
In consonance with these activities, it is also suggested that relevant 
company information is relayed to employees on a regular basis. This may 
be accomplished several ways such as through monthly newsletters 
briefings. Sharing all company issues and concerns with employees is not 
advocated, but addressing areas of misperceptions to a level sufficient for 
dispelling false information and attitudes, is recommended. 
10. A major source of job dissatisfaction for screener and supervisory 
personnel can best be described as an imbalance in the relationship between 
performance and consequences. Indeed, "fear of making a mistake or 
being wrong" and several reward issues were central to the Delphi 
objectives for career satisfaction and dissatisfaction. While consequences 
or failing tests or missing targets ranged from remedial training, 
suspension, or termination; rewards for successful performance were 
perceived as minimal and highly infrequent. One participant even remarked 
that passenger gratuities (i.e., for assisting handicapped travelers) 
generated more additional income than rewards from the company. 
The following potential incentive programs will recognize successful performance 
and act as a guide for employee incentives and rewards: 
• company contributions to a local award fund to acknowledge 
superior employees on a monthly basis. The fund should focus on 
employee recognition as the primary goal with awards consisting of 
retail and restaurant gift certificates, saving bonds, or small cash 
awards. 
• service pins or other uniform designations to acknowledge 
company tenure. 
• certificated and training record entries to document the completion 
of the previously identified training courses. Employees should be 
aware that these accomplishments will be documented on letters of 
recommendations. 
• cohipany non-cash awards (i.e., paid day off) for successful 
performance in FAA tests. 
• air carrier provided incentives for outstanding critical performance. 
- cash awards 
- use of amenity lounges for specified time periods 
- standby or restricted airline seats for domestic travel 
- amenity coupons (i.e., $5.00 airport food establishment 
vouchers) 
• competitive selection and recognition of screener and CSS of the 
quarter and year. 
Although the incentives have a monetary value on their own, the primary objective 
for such programs is to convey supervisor and company recognition for performance. 
Recognition of desirable performance is an integral component of employee satisfaction 
and will contribute to career tenure. 
The suggestions provided above were not meant to be exhaustive, but were given 
only to demonstrate the broad range that incentives can cover. Air carrier participation 
was suggested as an important element of this process since security personnel represent 
and act on behalf of carriers. It is to the benefits of the carriers to support such programs. 
Beyond the obvious responsibility and obligation of the carriers under FARs to maintain 
adequate security measures by employing qualified personnel, screener and CSS personnel 
directly impact passenger satisfaction and comfort. Improvements in employee tenure 
provides a more experienced, stabilized, well-trained, and reliable workforce. A 
dependable and experienced workforce directly impacts passenger flow by reducing 
passenger processing time that results from inadequate staffing levels and the 
comparatively slower performance that is characteristic of novice workers. 
If security personnel are provided the training seminars identified earlier, a 
significant decline in aircrew/passenger complaints could be realized. Professional and 
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courteous service by security personnel would reflect positively on the carrier as 
passengers experience less delays and confrontations. It is to this end that air carrier 
support and cooperation is needed. 
In summary, numerous recommendations have been offered with the goal to 
improve job satisfaction and increase employee tenure on the job. These interventions 
would have a direct impact on reducing employee turnover, increasing the experience base 
of the workforce, decreasing the demand on training resources, lowering the cost of 
recruitment and selection, and providing stability to the workforce. Given the effective 
security at airport facilities is by its very nature a team effort, improved workforce stability 
and longer employee tenure should increase performance of the overall security system. 
These interventions are based entirely on the work completed. The suggested 
interventions are just that "suggested". They have been proposed in response to those 
item/issues that were evaluated by security personnel as having the greatest impact on job 
satisfaction and reasons to leave the job. 
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PRE-BOARD X-RAY SCREENER SELECTION 
WORKSHOP AGENDA 
DAY 1 
8:00 - 9:00 Welcome and Introduction of Participants and Staff 
Brief Overview of Project, Goals, and Objectives 
Complete Participant Background Sheet, Pre-Workshop Survey 
and Pay Voucher 
9:00 - 9:30 COFFEE BREAK 
Distribute Workshop Materials 
Question & Answer Session on Workshop Objectives & Techniques 
Administrative & Payroll Items 
9:30 - 10:30 Workshop Training Session 
10:30 - 12:00 Discuss & Begin Objective I (Personality Items & Abilities) 
1200 - 1:00 LUNCH 
1:00 - 3:00 Objective I Work Session 
3:00 - 3:15 BREAK 
3:15 - 4:45 Complete Objective I (Consensus) 
4:45 - 5:00 Day 1 Wrap-Up 
DAY 2 
8:00 - 9:30 Discuss & Begin Objective II (Job Satisfiers and Motivators) 
9:30 - 9:45 COFFEE BREAK 
9:45 - 10:45 Objective U Work Session 
10:45 - 12:00 Complete Objective U (Consensus) 
12:00 - 1:00 LUNCH 
1:00 - 2:30 Discuss & Begin Objective IJJ (Reasons to Dislike Job or Quit) 
2:30 - 2:45 COFFEE BREAK 
2:45 - 3:30 Continue Objective UJ Work Session 
3:30 - 4:45 Complete Objective HI (Consensus) 
4:45 - 5:00 Post-Workshop Surveys and Workshop Wrap-Up 
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SMALL GROUP DELPHI OVERVIEW 
Delphi methods help the way we communicate within and between groups of people. The 
purpose of "having a Delphi" is to deal with a complex problem by bringing together a group of 
people who have the skills and expertise required, and to provide you with a structured way to 
communicate with one another to solve the problem. The Delphi methods help us to keep our 
attention on coming together with good solutions. We will be using a modification of Delphi 
techniques. This modification is one that uses small group techniques like feedback, information 
sharing, help from trained group leaders, acceptance of everybody's ideas, working as a group, 
and more. This way, the good ideas of each member of the group are used. The group develops a 
team spirit which leads to good and valuable results. 
We take this opportunity to welcome you to the Workshop. We look forward to working 
with you and coming up with ideas that will help the FAA and us with putting together a test to hire 
new screeners. 
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PRE-BOARD X-RAY SCREENER SELECTION 
Introduction 
The job of pre-board x-ray screener is an extremely important one. Your efforts are 
responsible for the protection of the lives and safety of millions of travelers each year. Your 
presence at airports helps to discourage would-be terrorist actions. How well you perform your 
job makes this possible. The amount of pay you receive to do this job does not reflect upon its 
importance. The job is so important that it is necessary that we only hire those who are best able to 
do the job, and who are willing to continue as screeners. That is the purpose of this workshop... 
to ask your help in finding the right people. 
In order to be able to hire the right people for the job of airport security screening it is 
necessary to make proper tests. Those who do well on the tests should do well on the job; those 
who do poorly on the tests we would expect to do poorly on the job. For instance, if someone 
does poorly on some sort of math test, we would not expect them to be good cashiers or 
bookkeepers. The tests have to be accurate in order to work. This means we should also Sxpect 
some people to do well on the tests while others do just OK or poorly. The entire idea is to figure 
out who will be successful and who won't be successful as a security screener by using the results 
of the tests we give them. 
One way to create these tests is to have successful and experienced screeners and CSS's, 
such as yourself, give the abilities, and rate them for importance, that are necessary to be a 
successful screener. It is also very important to know what things about the job cause you to want 
to keep the job, and for what reasons others quit. So, we really need to find out what it takes to be 
a successful screener, and why you and others like you want to keep this kind of job. Then it is 
simply a matter of finding other people who are like you. 
But how do we know if the tests work? We can be sure of two things. One, that you 
know what abilities and personality is needed to be a successful screener. And two, that we are 
pretty capable of making tests to measure what you say are important characteristics. But we still 
need to be sure we are both right....we wouldn't want to make mistakes and hire people who can 
not do the job because they aren't capable, or who will quit soon after getting the job. We also do 
not want to not hire people who would be good screeners because the tests are not accurate. 
We can do this by hiring people for the job and then giving them the tests. After training 
and a few weeks on the job we can see how well they detect targets. If we all did our job right; 
those who are not very good at screening, or who quit, would not have done very well on the tests 
we made. We would also expect that those who are good at performing the test also did well on 
the job. 
Now, back to where you fit in. You will be participating in the workshop to give your 
ideas on what skills, abilities, personality traits, and reasons to stay on the job are important for 
being a successful screener. Only you have a real understanding of this since you do the job. You 
are the EXPERTS. You will also be asked during the workshop to judge and rate those abilities, 
skills, reasons, and personality traits that are the most important to being a successful screener. 
We will also ask you for your opinions and ideas on how to measure how well a screener 
does the job. Since you are the experts, you are the people best able to decide if a person can do 
the job or not. This is only if time permits. 
WORKSHOP OBJECTIVES 
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The work will be based on your experience, knowledge, and some materials that we will provide. 
As a group, we will: 
Objective 1: Develop a list of the personality traits, characteristics, and abilities that YOU feel 
that an x-ray screener has - and needs to have - to be a superior screener. We 
want to know what makes the best screeners the BEST screeners. This will be 
done by: 
A. Changing or "scrubbing" the list that will be provided to you by adding 
things you think are important and are not on the list, or by removing items 
that you feel are not needed. The final list should only have items you feel 
are truly important to being a successful screener. 
B. Using a "critical incident methodology" to consider the list carefully and 
making any final changes. We will explain this during training. For now, 
consider it as thinking of really unusual and great screener targets detected 
and why they happened — what is it about the incident that made it happen. 
C. Rate the final list of items using the scales we provide to you. 
Objectives 2 & 3: Develop a set of job satisfiers and dislikes that impact screener decisions to stay 
on, or leave the job. 
A. Identify, discuss and make a list of the reasons why people enjoy or stay on 
the job. We want you to consider what is there about the job that keeps you 
and your fellow workers returning to the job each week. 
B. Identify, discuss and make a list of the reasons why people do not like the 
job or quit. What are the reasons others have told you they are quitting. 
C. Considering both lists, what do you suggest, can be done to improve the 
job, make it more enjoyable and satisfying, or how the pay and reward 
system can be made better. What will need to be changed to help people 
decide to stay on the job. 
NOTE: We do not want to discuss only the negative aspects of the job; we 
also want to discuss how to keep yourself and others on the job 
and with the company. 
D. For each of the two lists you created, rate the items using the scales 
provided. 
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PROTOCOLS FOR OBJECTIVE 1A 
We have prepared an initial list of 
characteristics and abilities which may be important 
to being a good screener. Part of this list comes 
from interviews we have conducted with screeners at 
various airports. Some of the list also comes from 
standard lists of abilities and traits that are used 
in this type of research. Still other traits and 
characteristics come from our looking at the X-Ray 
screeners job tasks. 
STOP - ANY QUESTIONS? 
What we need now is for you, our experts, to take 
this list and go through it. In going through it, see 
which items you think are not really important to 
being a good screener. (By "good screener" we mean a 
top-of-the-line, "best you have ever seen" screener). 
We also need you to think about which traits and 
abilities are not on the list - but need to be. 
STOP - ANY QUESTIONS? 
The way we will do this is to break up into two 
smaller groups and evaluate the list provided. Then 
we will rejoin as one group and get one final list by 
using the two smaller group lists as the basis. 
We need real discussion (yes, even disagreements) 
in the smaller, as well as, the whole group. We want 
consensus and that won't happen unless each of us is 
part of the discussion and each of us can say whatever 
we think. OK, at this point we can start the ball 
rolling. 
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PROTOCOLS FOR OBJECTIVE IB 
We have now modified our initial list of 
abilities and characteristics which are important to 
being a good screener. We have added items you 
thought were relevant and were not on the list, and we 
have removed items you felt were not needed. The 
final list should have only items you feel are truly 
important to being a good screener. 
STOP - ANY QUESTIONS? 
What we need to do now is make additional 
refinements to our list of positive abilities and 
characteristics. We will utilize the "Critical 
Incident Methodology" we briefed you on during 
training. Remember to think of really unusual and 
great screener targets detected - and most important, 
why you think they happened. 
STOP - ANY QUESTIONS? 
Now we will divide up into two small groups so 
that you can discuss "Critical Incidents" that you 
have experienced. Following this step, join together 
again in one group to share your experiences and to 
develop a final list of positive abilities and 
characteristics. 
Remember, any incident you believe significant 
needs to be considered. Listen carefully, also, to 
what the other group members have to contribute. 
Strive for consensus! 
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PROTOCOLS FOR OBJECTIVE 1C 
At this point we have developed a highly refined 
list of characteristics and abilities which are 
important to being a good screener. We have added 
items you thought relevant and removed items not 
needed. We have discussed "Critical Incidents" which 
have demonstrated good screener performance 
qualities. There is one more vital step remaining in 
our evaluation process. 
STOP - ANY QUESTION? 
What we will do now is rate the final list of 
positive characteristics and abilities. We will be 
using the rating scales and instruments we provided 
for you in training. This step is very important, so 
we want you to focus on what abilities you believe 
are crucial - and rate them accordingly. Please make 
sure you clearly understand the rating scales before 
proceeding. 
STOP - ANY QUESTIONS? 
Now we will divide up into two small groups so 
that you can work on the rating scales. Following 
this step, join together again in one group to develop 
the final rating scales. 
Remember the importance of meaningful discussion 
and group consensus. This final step is what we have 
been working towards in this workshop, so let's get to 
work! 
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PROTOCOLS FOR OBJECTIVE 3A 
We have prepared an initial list of reasons which 
may be why you enjoy the screening job or choose to 
remain in this career field. All of the reasons came 
from screeners that were interviewed while doing the 
job. Many of the reasons show what several screeners 
said about each item. Remember, these are reasons 
screeners said why they enjoyed the job. 
STOP - ANY QUESTIONS? 
Would like you to look over the list and see 
which items you think are not really important 
reasons for enjoying your work or for staying on the 
job. (By important we mean that the reason :does make 
a difference to you) . We also want you to think about 
what reasons are personally important to you and are 
not on the list - but you think they need to be. It 
doesn't matter if you think the reason is only 
important to yourself and no other screeners - if it 
is important to you, it needs to be on the list. 
STOP - ANY QUESTIONS? 
As you have been doing, you will break up into 
your groups again and discuss the list provided. 
After you finish your discussions, we will come back 
into the whole group and put together the final list 
by using the lists you developed in you workgroups as 
the basis. 
As before, we need real discussion and 
challenging items during all group work. Add items as 
you see fit. Don't worry about what the other group 
might think. We need consensus, but that won't happen 
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unless each of us participates in the discussion and 
says what they think. 
STOP - ANY QUESTIONS? 
Back to your workgroups again. Remember if it's 
important to you, it may be important to the 
workshop. 
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PROTOCOLS FOR OBJECTIVE 3B 
We have also prepared an initial list of job 
qualities which may contribute to an X-Ray screener 
disliking the work and/or choosing to leave this 
career field. This list was prepared in the same 
manner as the initial list in Objective 3A. Remember, 
these are comments from actual screeners. 
STOP - ANY QUESTIONS? 
We would like you to look over this list and 
determine which items you think are not the really 
important reasons for disliking the work as an X-Ray 
screener. We also want you to consider what qualities 
are not on the list - but should be. Remember, if it 
is important to you, then it should be on the list. 
STOP - ANY QUESTIONS? 
Now we will break up into two smaller groups and 
evaluate the list we provided. Following this step, 
join together again in one group and generate a final 
list for this objective. 
Remember the key elements of this step: 
meaningful discussion and group consensus. What you 
have to say is very important, even if a group member 
disagrees. Be willing to listen to what other group 
members have to say - then everyone will be encouraged 
to participate. 
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PROTOCOLS FOR OBJECTIVE 3D 
We have now generated two lists of job qualities 
which are part of screener decisions to stay on the 
job, or leave. We have developed a group consensus on 
why people enjoy X-Ray screener work, and on why 
people dislike the work. We have accomplished these 
objectives through meaningful discussion in your 
group. 
STOP - ANY QUESTIONS? 
What we need to do now is to rate the final list 
of job qualities. We will be utilizing the rating 
scales and instruments that were provided for you in 
training. This step is very important, so we want to 
concentrate on what job qualities you believe are 
significant - and rate them accordingly. Please 
ensure that you clearly understand the rating scales 
before we proceed. 
STOP - ANY QUESTIONS? 
Now we will break up into smaller groups and work 
on the rating scales. After this step, we will gather 
together in our large group to generate the final 
rating scales. 
Remember, again, the value of meaningful 
discussion and group consensus. 
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Pre-board X-rav Screener Selection: 
Participant Background 
Name 
1. Company working for: 
2. Time at current job: months 
3. Current airport assigned: 
4. Total length of time with company: 
5. Position (Check all that apply): 
CSS 
Screener 
Instructor 
Management 
6. X-ray screening system you use: 
6a. Other systems you have used: 
7. Other airport screening companies you have worked for: 
8. Training received and when (month, year): 
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PROTOCOLS FOR OBJECTIVE 3C 
We have now generated two lists of job qualities 
which are part of screener decisions to stay on, or 
leave, the job. We have developed a group consensus 
on why people enjoy X-Ray screener work, and on why 
people dislike the work. We have accomplished these 
objectives through meaningful discussion in your 
group. 
STOP - ANY QUESTIONS? 
What we need to do now is develop suggestions for 
improving X-Ray screener work. Considering both 
lists, what can be done to make the work more 
enjoyable and satisfying. Are changes necessary in 
the pay and reward system, and so on. This is an 
opportunity for you to make suggestions that could 
improve the quality of your working environment. 
STOP - ANY QUESTIONS? 
Now we will divide up into two small groups and 
evaluate these two lists. After completing this step, 
we will gather together in one group to develop two 
final lists for this objective. 
Remember we don't want to discuss only the 
negative aspects of the job - we also want to discuss 
how to improve the working environment and encourage 
employees to stay on. So let's get on with it. 
PRE-WORKSHOP SURVEY 
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As a pre-board x-ray screener (in this group 
of screeners), my skills in understanding 
and evaluating the job put me about here, 
relative to the others. 
Very Highly 
Skilled 
1 
No Skill 
At All 
I think my ideas will be in agreement with 
the rest of the screeners in this group. 
Yes, 
absolutely 
1 2 3 
No, not 
at all 
I know most of the screeners very well. 
Yes, 
prettv much 
1 2 3 
No, none 
at all 
I have some definite ideas about what the 
necessary skills and abilities are for 
success as a screener. 
Yes, 
1 2 3 
No, 
none 
I have been in airport screening longer than 
most of the other screeners here. 
Yes 
1 2 3 
No 
I am anticipating that the workshop is going 
to be a good experience and will accomplish 
what we need to do. 
Yes, I think 
it will be 
1 
No, I think 
it may be a 
waste of time 
6 
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Objective 1 
(Personality Items and Abilities) 
Directions: Referring to the following personality items and abilities, please circle the number 
that best represents your feeling. Answer quickly — your first impression is often your best. 
Please rate each of the following qualities regarding their contribution to superior performance: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
22. 
23. 
24. 
Absolutely Somewhat 
Unnecessary Helpful 
Persistent 
Suspicious 
Assertive 
Trusting 
Confident 
Dependable & Responsible 
Forceful 
Observant, Alert, & Attentive 
Curious 
Cooperative & Team Player 
Outgoing 
Enthusiastic & Energetic 
Motivated 
Thorough 
Tactful 1 
Courteous & Respectful 
Cautious 
Sensitive 
Helpful 1 
Calm 1 
Positive Mental Attitude 
Concerned 
Tolerance 
Honest 
L 2 
[ 2 
1 2 
I 2 
I 2 
I 2 
[ 2 
I 2 
[ 2 
I 2 
1 2 
[ 2 
[ 2 
I 2 
[ 2 
[ 2 
I 2 
1 2 
I 2 
[ 2 
i 2 
1 2 
[ 2 
[ 2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
Important 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
Absolutely 
Necessary 
5 
. 5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
Objective 2 
(Job Satisfiers and Motivators) 
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Directions: Referring to the following job satisfiers and motivators, please circle the number 
that best represents your feeling. Answer quickly — your first impression is often your best. 
In terms of a reason why I try to/want to stay on the job, I would say that this reason is: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
Absolutely Somewhat 
Unnecessary Helpful 
Importance of the 
work I do 
High responsibility 
of the job 
Enjoy helping people 
Like working with 
co-workers (companionship) 
Enjoy being busy 
Comfortable place 
to work 
Medical benefits 
Enjoy controlling people 
Retirement benefits 
Chance to move into 
supervisory jobs 
Good general work experience 
Wages job pays 
Being around people 
Doing airport security work 
Appreciation "by" 
supervisors 
Job is challenging (doing a job 
few others can do) 
Wanted to learn 
something new 
Dislike other jobs that 
were available 
Desire to protect people 
My family & friends think 
the job is important 
L 2 
L 2 
I 2 
I 2 
I 2 
I 2 
I 2 
I 2 
I 2 
I 2 
1 2 
L 2 
I 2 
[ 2 
i 2 
[ 2 
i 2 
[ 2 
[ 2 
i 2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
Important 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
Absolutely 
Necessary 
5 
5 
* 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
Objective 2 - continued 
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21. 
22. 
23. 
24. 
25. 
26. 
27. 
28. 
29. 
30. 
31. 
32. 
Absolutely Somewhat 
Unnecessary Helpful 
Appreciation "of supervisors 
Pride in my work 
Thrill of finding targets 
Job is easy 
Wanted to work in airports 
Flexible hours and days 
Opportunity for rewards 
To make friends 
Want to stop terrorist acts 
Recognition by company 
Potential job contacts 
Makes a good second income 
I 2 
I 2 
L 2 
I 2 
I 2 
I 2 
I 2 
I 2 
[ 2 
I 2 
[ 2 
L 2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
Important 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
Absolutely 
Necessary 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
• 5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
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Objective 3 
(Reasons to Dislike Job or Quit) 
Directions: Referring to the following items, please circle the number that best represents your 
feeling about why people quit and/or dislike being a screener. Answer quickly — your first 
impression is often your best. 
No Effect 
Whatsoever 
Little Effect 
If Any Important 
Major 
Reason 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
Stressful 
Poor pay 
Dislike hours 
Don't like working 
weekends 
Hard to get to work 
Job is boring 
Dislike co-workers 
Litde or no medical benefits 
Job is too difficult 
No retirement program 
Not appreciated 
Too much work for 
amount of pay 
Found "better" job 
Having to work holidays 
Job is causing physical 
discomfort (backache, 
headache, eye strain, etc.) 
Family and/or spouse 
wants me to quit 
Job is too fast paced 
Breaks/lunch time not enough 
19. No opportunities for 
advancement 
20. Just doing job temporarily 
to earn extra money 
21. Don't want to work 
in airports 
22. Criticism by supervisors 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
Objective 3 - continued 
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23. 
24. 
25. 
26. 
27. 
I don't find job important 
Confronting passengers 
Fear of finding weapons 
Job wasn't what I thought it was 
Decisions have to be 
Absolutely 
Unnecessary 
Somewhat 
Helpful 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
Important 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
Absolutely 
Necessary 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
made too fast 
28. Afraid to make a mistake 
or be wrong 
29. Passenger hostility 
30. Work is tiring and exhausting 
31. Not told up front what to expect 
32. Not being kept abreast of 
what's going on 
33. Management not listening to 
suggestions and/or complaints 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 
4 
5 
5 
5 
5 
GROUP GOALS SURVEY — PROCESS 
1 4 9 
How clear are the group goals? 
1 2 3 
No apparent goals Goal confusion, Average goal 
uncertainty, or conflict clarity 
Goals mostly 
clear 
Goals very 
clear 
How much trust and openness in the group? 
1 2 3 
Distrust Little trust Average trust and 
openness 
Considerable trust 
and openness 
Strong trust 
and openness 
How sensitive and aware are group members? 
1 2 3 
No awareness or Most members only Average sensitivity 
listening in the group interested in their and listening 
own views 
Better than usual 
listening 
Outstanding 
sensitivity 
to others 
4. How were group leadership needs met? 
1 2 
Not met, drifting Leadership was by 
one person 
Some leadership sharing 
among a few group 
members 
Leadership functions 
distributed among 
everyone 
Leadership needs 
met creatively 
and flexibly. 
Everyone helped 
lead the group 
5. How were group decisions made? 
1 2 
No decisions could Made by a few 
be reached 
Majority vote Attempts at considering 
all points of view 
Full participation 
and consensus 
How well were group resources used? 
1 2 
One or two contributed, Several tried to 
but everyone else was contribute, but were 
silent discouraged 
Average use of group 
members 
Group resources well 
used and all opinions 
encouraged 
Individual 
opinions fully 
and effectively 
used 
7. How much loyalty and sense of belonging 
1 2 
Members had no group Members not close but 
loyalty or sense of some friendly relations 
belonging 
to the group? 
3 
About average sense 
of belonging 
Some warm sense of 
belonging 
Strong sense of 
belonging among 
members 
POST-WORKSHOP SURVEY — PRODUCTS 150 
I feel satisfied with 
the results. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I'm not really happy with 
the results at all. 
I learned ideas from 
the feedback. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I didn't learn a thing from 
from the feedback. 
In general, I agreed 
with the ideas in the 1 
feedback. 
I disagreed with everything 
2 3 4 5 6 7 in the feedback. 
I could express my ideas _ 
o.k. this way. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I couldn't really say what 
I wanted to say. 
I feel as if I really 
wanted to talk to 
people. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I didn't feel the need to 
talk at all. 
I have a feeling people 
didn't understand or 1 
think about my reasons. 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
I think people understood 
my reasons pretty well. 
I think it went too I think it went too 
quickly. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 slowly. 
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Cover Letter 
EMBRY-RIDDLE 
AERONAUTICAL UNIVERSITY 
600 S. Clyde Morris Blvd. Daytona Beach, FL 32114-3900 (+1) (904) 226-6385 FAX (+1) (904) 226-7050 
Center for Aviation/Aerospace Research 
July 11, 1994 
Dear Participant: 
On behalf of the Federal Aviation Administration and Embry-Riddle Aeronautical 
University, welcome to the Delphi Workshop for Airline Passenger Pre-board Security 
Screeners. You have been carefully selected from among your colleagues because of 
your experience and skill. Your personal contribution and enthusiasm is 'greatly 
appreciated and will make a difference. The input and ideas you bring to the 
workshop will help decide the course of how to select future applicants for this vital 
career field. 
Most of your efforts will take place during the actual workshop. However, to be 
productive and allow the workshop to run smoothly, some preparation is needed. We 
think this will assist you in getting more out of the workshop and will make the 
experience more enjoyable. 
Attached is a rather substantial amount of information. Don't panic! These are aJi the 
materials we will use during the two day workshop — only a small portion is completed 
by you before we begin. We wanted to ensure there were no surprises for you on the 
day of the workshop. 
To ease you through this package we color-coded the materials you need to complete 
before the workshop. We also developed a set of steps to take you through the 
process. After each step the approximate time to complete the step is provided. 
BEFORE THE WORKSHOP: 
1. First, look over the PINK Agenda to become familiar with the workshop sequence. 
(3 minutes) 
2. Read the GREEN Overview information to understand what a Delphi Workshop is. 
(3 minutes) 
3. Read the BLUE Introduction to acquaint yourself with the project. (5 minutes) 
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4. Look over the GOLD pages. These pages list personality and ability descriptions 
and has a rating scale. The descriptions are words screeners used to describe 
themselves. Using the rating scale, choose a rating for EACH of the descriptions. 
Please write your rating next to each personality description. CHOOSE THE 
RATING YOU PERSONALLY FEEL IS MOST ACCURATE IN 
DESCRIBING SUPERIOR SCREENERS. Remember, these are your ratings, 
there are no right or wrong answers. (20 minutes) 
5. Look over the YELLOW pages. These pages list reasons from fellow screeners 
why they enjoy the job and includes a rating scale. Once again, using the rating 
scale, select the rating you feel is most accurate based on your personal opinion, 
and write your rating next to EACH reason. (20 minutes) 
6. Finally, look over the GRAY pages. These pages list reasons from fellow 
screeners why they dislike the job or want to quit and a rating scale. As before, 
using the rating scale, select the rating that best fits your personal opinion and write 
the rating next to each reason. (20 minutes) 
All your ratings ARE CONFIDENTIAL! Only you, and the project team, knows your 
answers. The security company you work for, the FAA, and the airline has no access 
to your individual answers. 
The workshop will focus entirely on these topic areas — what makes for a good 
screener, and what is it about the job that is enjoyable or causes people to quit. 
During the workshop these issues are the center of all group discussions. 
Again, thanks for your assistance. We want this to be a fun and rewarding experience 
for all....so please help out and "complete your homework". 
Sincerely, 
The Embry-Riddle Project Team Members 
P.S. Most of us were trained to screen and worked the positions a little ourselves. 
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Objectives 
Objective. Develop a set of job satisfiers 
and dislikes that impact screener decisions 
to stay on, or leave the job. 
A. Identify, discuss and make a list of 
the reasons why people enjoy or stay on the 
job. We want you to consider what is there 
about the job that keeps you and your fellow 
workers returning to the job each week. 
B. Identify, discuss and make a list of 
the reasons why people do not like the job 
or quit. What are the reasons others have 
told you they are quitting. 
C. Considering both lists, what do you 
suggest, can be done to improve the job, 
make it more enjoyable and satisfying, or 
how the pay and reward system can be made 
better. What will need to be changed to 
help people decide to stay on the job. 
D. For each of the two lists you 
created, rate the items using the scales 
provided. 
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